Cloud Security Assessment Report
The cloud scope from engagement 2026-09-ACM, published in full below. An authenticated, read only configuration review of an AWS account and an Amazon EKS cluster, run in support of an Amazon Selling Partner API Data Protection Policy submission. 12 findings, each scored under CVSS v3.1 and v4.0 and cited against a numbered DPP requirement.
This is a redacted sample from a real engagement. The client, Acme SaaS Pvt. Ltd., is fictional. The AWS account identifiers shown, 111122223333 and 222233334444, are Amazon's own documentation placeholders and belong to nobody.
Read this first
This is a redacted sample of a report from a real engagement. The client, Acme SaaS Pvt. Ltd., is fictional, and the company, domains, addresses and identifiers are illustrative. The AWS account identifiers 111122223333 and 222233334444 are Amazon's own documentation placeholders, not real accounts. Findings, severities, methodology and remediation guidance reflect the actual work. The full PDF is available to download.
Cloud Security Assessment Report
Acme SaaS Pvt. Ltd., AWS and Amazon EKS Configuration Review
Prepared for Acme SaaS Pvt. Ltd.
Prepared by Cyber Secify Consulting (OPC) Private Limited
Lead Tester Rathnakara GN, OSCP (OS-101-34173)
This document contains confidential and proprietary information. Neither this document nor the information herein may be reproduced, used, or disclosed to or for the benefit of any third party without the prior written consent of Cyber Secify Consulting (OPC) Private Limited. This is a redacted sample containing fictional data.
Document Control
| Field | Detail |
|---|---|
| Document Title | Acme SaaS Cloud Security Assessment Report |
| Client | Acme SaaS Pvt. Ltd. |
| Assessment Scope | AWS account and Amazon EKS cluster configuration |
| Engagement Reference | 2026-09-ACM |
| Version | 1.0 (First Issue) |
| Report Date | 19 September 2026 |
| Engagement Window | 1 September to 19 September 2026 |
| Prepared By | Rathnakara GN, OSCP (OS-101-34173), Lead Assessor |
| Reviewed By | Ashok Kamat, Chief Executive Officer, Cybersecify |
| Classification | Confidential, For Acme SaaS and Cybersecify only |
| Distribution | Daniel Reyes, Priya Nair (Acme SaaS); assessment team (Cybersecify) |
Table of Contents
- Executive Summary Overall risk, key statistics
- Scope and Methodology Assets, standards, tools, risk ratings
- Findings Summary All 12 findings, CVSS scoring, status
- Detailed Findings 4 written up in full, 12 listed
- Test Cases Control tested, DPP section, result
- Compliance Evidence Package DPP, SOC 2 and ISO 27001:2022 coverage
- Programme Appendix Finding to DPP control mapping
- Appendix Team, distribution, glossary
- Disclaimer Limitations and sample notice
Executive Summary
Cybersecify performed a configuration review of Acme SaaS's AWS account and Amazon EKS cluster in support of the Amazon SP-API Data Protection Policy submission. The review covered where Amazon Information is stored, who and what can reach it, where copies of it travel, how long it is kept, and which third parties receive it.
The perimeter and cryptography are in good order. The edge firewall enforces, transport is encrypted end to end, data at rest is encrypted under customer managed keys, MFA is universal and the root account is dormant. The findings are not about those controls; they are about copies of Amazon data that sit outside their reach.
Two conditions are severe. The bucket holding nightly order exports carries a wildcard principal, so any AWS account holder can read and overwrite files containing buyer names, addresses and order detail. Separately, a snapshot of the production order database is restored into the development account on a schedule, putting live buyer records in front of fourteen engineers in an environment with none of the production monitoring. Two further items are high: an administrative access key that has been active for 412 days, and buyer data forwarded to an observability provider that has never been assessed.
Key Statistics
Business Impact Summary
The pattern across these findings is that Amazon Information has escaped the environment built to protect it. The export bucket moves it outside the account entirely, the development restore moves it outside the production control set, the cross region replication moves it outside the registered country, and the observability and model providers move it outside the assessed supply chain. None of these requires an attacker to defeat a control; each is a copy made deliberately for an operational reason, with the protection left behind. Retention compounds it: three years of buyer records are held where thirty days would do, so any one of these paths exposes far more than it needs to.
Scope and Methodology
This was an authenticated configuration review of the AWS account and Amazon EKS cluster using a read only role. No destructive actions were performed and no production data was exported. Findings are drawn from the observed configuration state during the engagement window.
In Scope Assets
| Area | Detail |
|---|---|
| AWS account | 111122223333 (us-east-1) |
| Kubernetes | Amazon EKS cluster acme-eks, workloads, secrets and network policy configuration |
| Edge | Application Load Balancer and web application firewall association |
| Data at rest | EBS, persistent volumes, RDS and cache encryption posture |
| Identity | IAM users, roles, policies and MFA posture |
| Logging | CloudTrail, VPC Flow Logs and related monitoring configuration |
Out of Scope
Destructive or availability affecting testing; changes to production configuration; exploitation of third party managed services beyond observing their configuration; application layer testing, which is covered in the separate web application report.
Methodology and Standards
| Standard | Application |
|---|---|
| CVSS v3.1 and v4.0 | Dual scoring on every finding with full vector strings. |
| CWE | Root cause classification on every finding. |
| CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark | Account level configuration baseline. |
| CIS Amazon EKS Benchmark | Cluster and workload configuration baseline. |
| Amazon SP-API DPP | Every finding cited against the published Data Protection Policy: Section 1 General Security Requirements and Section 2 Additional Security Requirements Specific to PII. |
Tools
| Tool | Version | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| AWS CLI | v2.36 | Authenticated read only inspection of account configuration and IAM. |
| kubectl | v1.37.0 | Inspection of cluster workloads, secrets, service accounts and network policies. |
| Prowler | v5.14 | Automated AWS configuration checks against CIS benchmarks. |
| kube-bench | v0.13 | Automated EKS configuration checks against the CIS Kubernetes benchmark. |
| ScoutSuite | v5.14 | Cross service AWS posture review and reporting. |
Testing Approach
Authenticated, read only configuration review of the AWS account and the Amazon EKS cluster. Automated benchmark tooling was used for breadth and every reported finding was manually verified against the live configuration. No destructive actions were performed and no production data was exported.
Risk Rating Definitions
Severity is assigned from the CVSS v3.1 base score. Ratings describe the risk the condition presents in this environment, not a generic product rating.
| Rating | CVSS v3.1 | Definition |
|---|---|---|
| Critical | 9.0 to 10.0 | Direct, reliable compromise of Amazon information or of the platform holding it. Requires immediate containment ahead of any other remediation work. |
| High | 7.0 to 8.9 | A practical attack path to sensitive data or to administrative control, requiring no unusual preconditions. Remediate within one sprint. |
| Medium | 4.0 to 6.9 | A real weakness that needs a further condition, an existing foothold, or a chained finding to be exploited, or that materially weakens a control Amazon requires. Remediate within two sprints. |
| Low | 0.1 to 3.9 | Limited direct impact. Typically a defence in depth, logging, or hardening gap that raises cost and difficulty for an attacker once resolved. Address in the next hardening cycle. |
| Info | 0.0 | No vulnerability. An observation recorded because it affects the security posture or the evidence available to an assessor. |
Deliverables and Retest
This v1.0 report is the report of record for its scope. A full retest of every finding is carried out within 30 calendar days of delivery. The v2.0 retest report, showing each finding as closed, partially closed, or accepted as a documented risk, is issued within 3 business days of the retest completing. A Letter of Attestation, signed by the OSCP certified lead tester, follows the retest and confirms that an independent manual penetration test was performed to Amazon's requirements. The Letter is supporting evidence for the SP-API Data Protection Policy submission and is not a certification.
Policy Basis for the Mapping
Every DPP citation in this report refers to a numbered requirement in the Amazon Data Protection Policy as published: Section 1, General Security Requirements (1.1 Network Protection through 1.7 Request for Deletion or Return), and Section 2, Additional Security Requirements Specific to Personally Identifiable Information (2.1 Data Retention through 2.7 Vulnerability Management). No control domain is inferred or renumbered. Where a finding touches more than one requirement, each is cited.
Amazon Required Report Elements
This report is structured to cover the six elements Amazon expects of a penetration test report submitted in support of SP-API DPP approval. Amazon reviews and decides on the submission; this report is independent, third party evidence and not an approval.
| # | Required Element | Where It Is Covered |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Executive summary with overall risk rating and severity breakdown | Section 1 |
| 2 | Testing methodology and scope coverage | Section 2 |
| 3 | Findings classified by severity using CVSS v3.1 and v4.0 | Sections 3 and 4 |
| 4 | Tool output and manual verification evidence | Section 4, Evidence on every finding |
| 5 | Remediation guidance with status tracking | Sections 3 and 4 |
| 6 | Compliance mapping to the applicable control domains | Section 6 |
Findings Summary
The assessment produced 12 findings: 2 Critical, 2 High, 4 Medium, 2 Low and 2 Informational. Four are grouped as P1 because each of them, on its own, places Amazon Information outside the control set that the submission attests to.
Severity Distribution
| Severity | Count | CVSS Range | Remediation Priority |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 2 | 9.0 to 10.0 | Immediate (P0) |
| High | 2 | 7.0 to 8.9 | Within 1 sprint |
| Medium | 4 | 4.0 to 6.9 | Within 2 sprints |
| Low | 2 | 0.1 to 3.9 | Next hardening cycle |
| Info | 2 | 0.0 | Best practice recommendation |
All Findings
| DPP Priority | Finding ID | Title | Test Case | Severity | CVSS v3.1 | CVSS v4.0 | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| P1 | CS-2026-C01 | Exported Order Reports Readable and Writable by Any AWS Account | TC-01 | Critical | 9.1 | 9.2 | Open |
| P1 | CS-2026-C02 | Production Amazon PII Restored into the Non-Production Account | TC-02 | Critical | 9.6 | 9.3 | Open |
| P1 | CS-2026-C03 | Long-Lived Access Key with AdministratorAccess Active for 412 Days | TC-03 | High | 8.8 | 8.5 | Open |
| P1 | CS-2026-C04 | Buyer PII Forwarded to an Unassessed Third-Party Observability Provider | TC-04 | High | 7.5 | 7.7 | Open |
| P2 | CS-2026-C05 | Amazon Information Replicated to a Region Outside the Registered Country | TC-05 | Medium | 6.8 | 6.4 | Open |
| P2 | CS-2026-C06 | No Deletion Controls for Amazon Information Past the Thirty Day Window | TC-06 | Medium | 5.8 | 6.0 | Open |
| P2 | CS-2026-C07 | No Data Loss Prevention or Egress Controls on the Account | TC-07 | Medium | 5.3 | 5.6 | Open |
| P2 | CS-2026-C08 | Amazon Information Not Tagged or Logically Separated from Other Data | TC-08 | Medium | 4.4 | 4.8 | Open |
| P3 | CS-2026-C09 | Incident Response Plan Omits the Amazon Notification Path | TC-09 | Low | 3.9 | 3.6 | Open |
| P3 | CS-2026-C10 | No Configuration Baseline or Drift Detection for Account Resources | TC-10 | Low | 3.0 | 2.7 | Open |
| P3 | CS-2026-C11 | No Monitoring for Exposed Credentials on External Sources | TC-11 | Info | 0.0 | 0.0 | Open |
| P3 | CS-2026-C12 | Order Text Passed to a Third Party Language Model Without Documented Review | TC-12 | Info | 0.0 | 0.0 | Open |
This is a redacted sample. The table above lists the full finding set by title; Section 4 gives complete write ups for a representative finding in each priority band (P1, P2, P3) and across the severity range, so the reader can see the exact format, evidence, and Amazon DPP mapping without reproducing every finding. A real engagement report details every finding in full.
Priority Definitions
Findings are grouped by remediation priority for the Amazon SP-API Data Protection Policy submission. P1 findings block the submission and must be remediated and retested before the Letter of Attestation is issued. P2 findings are DPP relevant but not submission blocking; they strengthen the attestation and should be remediated on the stated timeline. P3 findings are lower priority hardening items that improve the overall security posture and are addressed in the normal hardening cycle.
Detailed Findings
All 12 findings are listed below in their priority bands. Four carry the complete write up the source report publishes: CS-2026-C01 and CS-2026-C02 from P1, CS-2026-C06 from P2 and CS-2026-C12 from P3. The other eight carry the severity, both CVSS scores, the test case and the DPP mapping the report records for them, and are marked where the write up is not reproduced in this redacted sample.
P1 · DPP Submission Blockers
Exported Order Reports Readable and Writable by Any AWS Account
Description
The bucket that holds nightly exports of Amazon order reports carries a policy statement whose
principal is a wildcard, scoped only by an aws:PrincipalType
condition. Any authenticated AWS principal in any account can therefore both read and
overwrite the exported objects. The exports contain buyer names, shipping addresses and order
line detail derived from the SP-API.
Steps to Reproduce
- Enumerate the buckets that receive report exports and retrieve each bucket policy.
- Confirm the policy statement principal is a wildcard rather than a named account, role or organisation identifier.
- Confirm the statement grants both read and write actions on the export prefix.
- Confirm from an unrelated principal that the objects are retrievable and that the Block Public Access account setting does not constrain cross account principals.
Evidence
aws s3api get-bucket-policy --bucket acme-order-exports Statement: Principal "*" | Action [s3:GetObject, s3:PutObject] | Resource arn:aws:s3:::acme-order-exports/exports/* aws s3api get-public-access-block --bucket acme-order-exports BlockPublicPolicy: true (does not restrict cross account principals granted by policy)
Business Impact
Amazon buyer data leaves the account boundary entirely. Any AWS account holder who learns or guesses the bucket name can download every export, and the write permission allows an attacker to replace an export with altered content that downstream reconciliation would then treat as authoritative. This is a data breach path that requires no credential compromise at Acme SaaS.
Why Amazon Cares
Uncontrolled access to Amazon Information is the condition the DPP exists to prevent. A wildcard principal on a bucket holding buyer PII fails DPP 1.1, which requires public access to be restricted to approved users, and DPP 1.3, which requires access on a need to know basis, and would be treated as a disqualifying finding rather than a gap to be scheduled.
Remediation
Replace the wildcard principal with an explicit list of account or organisation identifiers,
or remove the cross account grant entirely and serve the exports through a pre signed URL with
a short expiry. Enable BlockPublicAccess at the account level,
turn on IAM Access Analyzer for external access findings on every bucket holding Amazon data,
and review CloudTrail data events for the export prefix to establish whether the objects were
retrieved by an unknown principal.
Compliance Mapping
| Framework | Control / Relevance |
|---|---|
| SOC 2 (TSC) | CC6.1 logical access, CC6.3 least privilege, CC6.6 boundary protection |
| ISO 27001:2022 | A.5.15 Access control, A.8.3 Information access restriction, A.5.34 PII protection |
| MITRE ATT&CK | T1530 Data from Cloud Storage Object |
| Amazon DPP | DPP 1.1 Network Protection, DPP 1.3 Least Privilege Principle |
Production Amazon PII Restored into the Non-Production Account
Description
A snapshot of the production order database is restored on a recurring schedule into the development account so that engineers can test against realistic data. The restored instance holds live buyer names, addresses, contact details and order history derived from the SP-API. Every member of the developer IAM group in that account holds read access to it, and the development account does not carry the logging, alerting or network controls applied to production.
Steps to Reproduce
- List the RDS instances in the development account and identify those restored from a production snapshot.
- Confirm the restored instance carries buyer records rather than synthetic or masked data.
- Enumerate the IAM principals that can reach the instance and confirm the developer group is among them.
- Compare the control set on the development account against production: logging, alerting, network isolation and session recording.
Evidence
aws rds describe-db-instances --profile dev acme-dev-orders restored from: arn:aws:rds:...:snapshot:prod-orders-nightly aws rds describe-db-snapshots --profile dev --query 'DBSnapshots[].SourceRegion' source: production account 222233334444 developer group policy: rds-db:connect on acme-dev-orders (14 principals)
Business Impact
The population of people and systems that can reach Amazon buyer data is far larger than the production access list implies, and it sits in an account that is monitored less closely. A compromise of any developer credential, or of any workload in the development account, reaches the same buyer records that production protects carefully. The production access controls are, in effect, bypassed by a copy.
Why Amazon Cares
The DPP expects Amazon Information to be confined to the systems that need it and to be handled under the same controls wherever it exists. Using live buyer data to populate a non production environment contradicts DPP 2.5, which requires separate test and production environments, and DPP 1.3, which grants access on a need to know basis, and it is the kind of finding that blocks a submission on its own.
Remediation
Stop restoring production snapshots into the development account. Generate the development dataset by masking or synthesising the buyer fields, and where realistic volumes are needed, use record counts and value distributions rather than real values. Delete the existing restored instances and their snapshots, revoke the cross account snapshot share, and add a preventive control (a service control policy or an automated check) that fails any restore of a production snapshot outside the production account.
Compliance Mapping
| Framework | Control / Relevance |
|---|---|
| SOC 2 (TSC) | CC6.1 logical access, CC6.3 least privilege, CC8.1 change management |
| ISO 27001:2022 | A.8.31 Separation of environments, A.8.33 Test information, A.5.34 PII protection |
| MITRE ATT&CK | T1213 Data from Information Repositories |
| Amazon DPP | DPP 2.5 Secure Coding Practices, DPP 1.3 Least Privilege Principle |
Long-Lived Access Key with AdministratorAccess Active for 412 Days
The description, steps to reproduce, evidence, business impact and remediation for this finding are not reproduced in this redacted sample. A real engagement report details every finding in full, in the format shown above.
Buyer PII Forwarded to an Unassessed Third-Party Observability Provider
The description, steps to reproduce, evidence, business impact and remediation for this finding are not reproduced in this redacted sample. A real engagement report details every finding in full, in the format shown above.
P2 · Attestation Strengthening Findings
Amazon Information Replicated to a Region Outside the Registered Country
The description, steps to reproduce, evidence, business impact and remediation for this finding are not reproduced in this redacted sample. A real engagement report details every finding in full, in the format shown above.
No Deletion Controls for Amazon Information Past the Thirty Day Window
Description
Buyer personally identifiable information derived from the SP-API is retained indefinitely. The orders schema holds buyer name, address and contact fields for orders fulfilled more than three years ago, the export prefix has no lifecycle configuration, and there is no scheduled job, database policy or object expiry rule that removes buyer PII once the retention window has passed.
Steps to Reproduce
- Query the earliest fulfilment date present in the orders schema and confirm buyer PII fields are still populated for it.
- Retrieve the lifecycle configuration for every prefix holding exported order data.
- Search the account for scheduled tasks, Lambda functions or database jobs that perform a retention purge.
- Confirm no separate archive holds the data under a documented legal or tax retention basis.
Evidence
aws s3api get-bucket-lifecycle-configuration --bucket acme-order-exports NoSuchLifecycleConfiguration SELECT MIN(fulfilled_at), COUNT(*) FROM orders WHERE buyer_email IS NOT NULL; 2023-02-11 | 1,284,663 (buyer PII retained on fulfilled orders beyond three years)
Business Impact
Every record retained past the point of business need enlarges the consequence of any future breach without adding value. The volume held here means an incident that would otherwise expose a month of orders instead exposes three years of them, and it puts the environment outside the retention rule the policy sets rather than inside it.
Why Amazon Cares
DPP 2.1 is explicit: PII is retained no longer than thirty days after order delivery, and only to fulfil orders, calculate and remit taxes, produce tax invoices, or meet a legal requirement. Where a tax or regulatory obligation does apply, the policy requires the archive to be held cold or offline rather than live. Indefinite retention in a live database meets neither condition, and DPP 1.7 further requires that Information can be deleted on request within 72 hours, which is not achievable without a deletion mechanism.
Remediation
Define the retention basis for each field rather than for the record as a whole, so that tax relevant fields can be kept while buyer contact fields are removed. Implement deletion as an automated job with a log of what was removed and when, apply an S3 lifecycle rule to the export prefix, and add a monthly control check that reports any buyer PII older than the retention window. Backfill the deletion across the existing data once the job is proven on a subset.
Compliance Mapping
| Framework | Control / Relevance |
|---|---|
| SOC 2 (TSC) | CC6.5 disposal of data, P4.3 retention and disposal |
| ISO 27001:2022 | A.5.33 Protection of records, A.5.34 PII protection, A.8.10 Information deletion |
| MITRE ATT&CK | N/A (data governance condition, no adversary technique) |
| Amazon DPP | DPP 2.1 Data Retention, DPP 1.7 Request for Deletion or Return |
No Data Loss Prevention or Egress Controls on the Account
The description, steps to reproduce, evidence, business impact and remediation for this finding are not reproduced in this redacted sample. A real engagement report details every finding in full, in the format shown above.
Amazon Information Not Tagged or Logically Separated from Other Data
The description, steps to reproduce, evidence, business impact and remediation for this finding are not reproduced in this redacted sample. A real engagement report details every finding in full, in the format shown above.
P3 · Lower Priority Hardening Findings
Incident Response Plan Omits the Amazon Notification Path
The description, steps to reproduce, evidence, business impact and remediation for this finding are not reproduced in this redacted sample. A real engagement report details every finding in full, in the format shown above.
No Configuration Baseline or Drift Detection for Account Resources
The description, steps to reproduce, evidence, business impact and remediation for this finding are not reproduced in this redacted sample. A real engagement report details every finding in full, in the format shown above.
No Monitoring for Exposed Credentials on External Sources
The description, steps to reproduce, evidence, business impact and remediation for this finding are not reproduced in this redacted sample. A real engagement report details every finding in full, in the format shown above.
Order Text Passed to a Third Party Language Model Without Documented Review
Description
The support summarisation service sends buyer message threads and order notes to a third party language model endpoint to generate case summaries. The outbound payload was observed to carry the raw message body, which can include buyer names and address fragments. There is no record of a review covering what the provider retains, whether the payload is used for model training, or which contractual terms apply.
Steps to Reproduce
- Identify the workloads in the cluster that call an external model endpoint.
- Capture the outbound request shape and confirm whether buyer fields are redacted before transmission.
- Check for a documented assessment of the provider and for terms covering retention and training use.
- Confirm whether the provider appears in the third party inventory shared with Amazon.
Evidence
kubectl get deploy support-summariser -o jsonpath='{.spec...env}'
MODEL_ENDPOINT=https://api.<provider>.example/v1/responses
request body: { "input": "<raw buyer message thread>" } (no redaction step observed) Business Impact
Amazon derived content leaves the environment to a party that is not in the assessed inventory and under terms that have not been reviewed. Whether that is acceptable depends entirely on the provider terms and on what is actually sent, neither of which is currently established, so the exposure cannot be sized. It is recorded as informational because no loss has been demonstrated, not because the question is closed.
Remediation
Redact buyer identifiers before the payload leaves the cluster, so the model receives the message content without the personal fields. Record the provider in the third party inventory, obtain terms that exclude the data from training and define a retention period, and complete the same supplier assessment applied to other processors of Amazon Information. Record the provider and the data fields it receives in the processing record required by DPP 2.2.
Compliance Mapping
| Framework | Control / Relevance |
|---|---|
| SOC 2 (TSC) | CC9.2 vendor and business partner management |
| ISO 27001:2022 | A.5.19 Information security in supplier relationships, A.5.34 PII protection |
| MITRE ATT&CK | T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service |
| Amazon DPP | DPP 2.2 Data Governance, DPP 1.3 Least Privilege Principle |
Test Cases
Each test case maps to the assessed control and the finding that resulted. Every case below returned a FAIL and corresponds to a confirmed finding; controls confirmed working are recorded in the Compliance Evidence Package.
| TC # | Test Case | Target | DPP § | Result | Finding |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TC-01 | Verify no cross account or wildcard principal on stores holding Amazon data | S3 | 1.1 / 1.3 | FAIL | CS-2026-C01 |
| TC-02 | Verify production Amazon data is not present in non-production environments | RDS | 2.5 | FAIL | CS-2026-C02 |
| TC-03 | Verify age, scope and rotation of programmatic credentials | IAM | 1.4 | FAIL | CS-2026-C03 |
| TC-04 | Verify the processing record covers every party receiving Amazon data | Egress | 2.2 | FAIL | CS-2026-C04 |
| TC-05 | Verify replication targets against applicable privacy and regulatory requirements | S3 / RDS | 2.2 | FAIL | CS-2026-C05 |
| TC-06 | Verify PII is deleted within thirty days of order delivery | RDS / S3 | 2.1 | FAIL | CS-2026-C06 |
| TC-07 | Verify alarms detect Information leaving its protected boundary | VPC | 2.6 | FAIL | CS-2026-C07 |
| TC-08 | Verify Amazon Information is inventoried and identifiable | Account | 2.3 | FAIL | CS-2026-C08 |
| TC-09 | Verify the incident response plan defines escalation to Amazon within 24 hours | Process | 1.6 | FAIL | CS-2026-C09 |
| TC-10 | Verify changes to systems holding PII are tested, approved and restricted | Account | 2.7 | FAIL | CS-2026-C10 |
| TC-11 | Verify credentials are not exposed in public repositories or external sources | Process | 2.5 | FAIL | CS-2026-C11 |
| TC-12 | Verify parties receiving Amazon data are recorded and the payload is minimised | EKS | 2.2 | FAIL | CS-2026-C12 |
Compliance Evidence Package
This section maps findings and positive controls to the published Amazon Data Protection Policy, the SOC 2 Trust Services Criteria, and ISO 27001:2022 Annex A. Every DPP citation in this report refers to a numbered requirement in the policy as published by Amazon: Section 1, General Security Requirements, and Section 2, Additional Security Requirements Specific to Personally Identifiable Information. The table below covers all fourteen requirements, not only those where a finding was raised. This assessment is independent evaluation evidence. Cybersecify is not a CPA firm and does not perform the SOC 2 examination, is not ISO 27001 or SOC 2 certified, and does not approve the DPP submission.
A. Positive Controls Confirmed
| Domain | Evidence |
|---|---|
| Edge Protection | An enforcing web application firewall is associated with every internet facing load balancer, with rule groups in block mode. |
| Encryption in Transit | TLS 1.2 or better is enforced at the edge and between services; plaintext listeners are absent. |
| Encryption at Rest | Volumes, databases and object storage are encrypted, with customer managed keys on the stores holding Amazon data. |
| Identity | MFA is enforced on every console user and the root account is dormant with no access keys. |
| Audit Logging | Account wide CloudTrail is enabled with log file validation and delivers to a protected trail. |
| Vulnerability Management | Continuous scanning is enabled across compute and images, and this assessment supplies the annual test. |
B. Amazon DPP Section Coverage
| DPP § | Requirement | Status | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1.1 | Network Protection | Gap | Public access to the export bucket is not restricted to approved users (C01). |
| 1.2 | Access Management | Partial | Unique IDs and account lockout are in place, but the quarterly access review has not removed a dormant privileged credential (C03). |
| 1.3 | Least Privilege Principle | Gap | Need to know is not enforced on the exports, the development copy, or the third party feed (C01, C02, C04). |
| 1.4 | Credential Management | Gap | An administrative access key has not been rotated within the twelve month period (C03). |
| 1.5 | Encryption in Transit | Met | TLS 1.2 or better is enforced on all internal and external endpoints. |
| 1.6 | Incident Response Plan | Partial | A plan exists but defines no escalation path to Amazon and has not been reviewed within six months (C09). |
| 1.7 | Request for Deletion or Return | Partial | No mechanism exists to delete Information on request within 72 hours (C06). |
| 2.1 | Data Retention | Gap | PII is held live for more than three years after order delivery (C06). |
| 2.2 | Data Governance | Gap | The processing record omits two recipients and does not cover the replication target (C04, C05, C08, C12). |
| 2.3 | Asset Management | Partial | An asset inventory exists but does not identify which systems hold PII (C08, C10). |
| 2.4 | Encryption at Rest | Met | AES-256 across volumes, databases and object storage, with key material restricted to service principals. |
| 2.5 | Secure Coding Practices | Gap | Test and production environments are not separate for buyer data, and exposure of credentials in public sources is not monitored (C02, C11). |
| 2.6 | Logging and Monitoring | Partial | Logging and retention meet the standard, but no alarm detects Information leaving its protected boundary (C07). |
| 2.7 | Vulnerability Management | Partial | Scanning and this test satisfy the 180 day requirement, but changes to systems holding PII are not controlled (C10). |
C. SOC 2 Trust Services Criteria Coverage
| Criterion | Description | Findings |
|---|---|---|
| CC6.1 | Logical access and data protection | C01, C02, C03 |
| CC6.3 | Least privilege | C01, C02 |
| CC6.5 | Disposal of data | C06 |
| CC7.2 | Detection and prevention | C07, C11 |
| CC7.4 | Incident response | C09 |
| CC8.1 | Change and configuration management | C08, C10 |
| CC9.2 | Vendor and business partner management | C04, C12 |
D. ISO 27001:2022 Annex A Coverage
| Control | Description | Findings |
|---|---|---|
| A.5.15 | Access control | C01, C02, C03 |
| A.5.19 | Supplier relationships | C04, C12 |
| A.5.26 | Response to information security incidents | C09 |
| A.5.34 | Privacy and protection of PII | C01, C02, C05, C06 |
| A.8.10 | Information deletion | C06 |
| A.8.9 | Configuration management | C08, C10 |
| A.8.12 | Data leakage prevention | C07 |
| A.8.31 | Separation of environments | C02 |
Programme Appendix
Finding to DPP control mapping and priority band coverage for the SP-API Data Protection Policy submission programme.
| Finding | Severity | DPP § | DPP Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| CS-2026-C01 | Critical | 1.1 / 1.3 | Public access to Amazon exports is not restricted to approved users |
| CS-2026-C02 | Critical | 2.5 / 1.3 | Test and production environments are not separate for buyer data |
| CS-2026-C03 | High | 1.4 / 1.2 | Programmatic credential exceeds the rotation period and remains privileged |
| CS-2026-C04 | High | 2.2 / 1.3 | Processing record omits a party that receives Amazon Information |
| CS-2026-C05 | Medium | 2.2 | Replication target not assessed against applicable privacy regulation |
| CS-2026-C06 | Medium | 2.1 / 1.7 | PII held live beyond thirty days after delivery, no deletion path |
| CS-2026-C07 | Medium | 2.6 | No alarm detects Information extracted from its protected boundary |
| CS-2026-C08 | Medium | 2.3 / 2.2 | Amazon Information is not inventoried or identifiable for handling |
| CS-2026-C09 | Low | 1.6 | Plan omits escalation to Amazon within the 24 hour window |
| CS-2026-C10 | Low | 2.7 / 2.3 | Changes to systems holding PII are not tested, approved or restricted |
| CS-2026-C11 | Info | 2.5 | Credential exposure in public sources would not be detected |
| CS-2026-C12 | Info | 2.2 | Model provider receives Amazon content outside the processing record |
Appendix
A. Testing Team and Authorisation
| Assessor | Role | Credentials |
|---|---|---|
| Rathnakara GN | Lead Assessor | OSCP (OS-101-34173) |
B. Report Distribution
| Recipient | Organisation | Copy |
|---|---|---|
| Daniel Reyes | Acme SaaS Pvt. Ltd. | Electronic |
| Priya Nair | Acme SaaS Pvt. Ltd. | Electronic |
| Rathnakara GN | Cyber Secify Consulting (OPC) Private Limited | Electronic |
| Ashok Kamat | Cyber Secify Consulting (OPC) Private Limited | Electronic |
C. Glossary
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| ALB | Application Load Balancer, the AWS layer 7 load balancer that terminates TLS and routes traffic to backend targets. |
| CVSS | Common Vulnerability Scoring System. A 0 to 10 severity score with a vector string; this report uses v3.1 and v4.0. |
| EKS | Amazon Elastic Kubernetes Service, a managed Kubernetes control plane. |
| IRSA | IAM Roles for Service Accounts, a mechanism to issue scoped, short lived AWS credentials to Kubernetes workloads. |
| NetworkPolicy | A Kubernetes resource that restricts network traffic between workloads. |
| VPC Flow Logs | A record of accepted and rejected network flows in an AWS virtual private cloud. |
| WAF | Web Application Firewall, an enforcing filter in front of web traffic; count mode observes without blocking. |
Disclaimer
Limitations of Testing
Penetration testing is inherently limited by the scope, time, and resources allocated to the engagement. No individual or organisation can guarantee identifying all security issues. The testing performed is conducted on a best effort basis, and the findings reported herein are specific to the environment provided for testing.
Scope of Findings
The reported findings apply exclusively to the tested environment and configurations during testing. Information systems rely on human factors and can be inherently vulnerable to human error. While Cybersecify has endeavoured to identify significant security vulnerabilities in the analysed systems, it is impossible to assure that all potential vulnerabilities have been discovered. This document does not constitute legal advice.
Continued Vigilance
Security is an ongoing process. Regular assessments and updates to security measures are essential to maintaining a strong security posture. Cybersecify recommends periodic penetration testing and continuous monitoring to adapt to new threats and vulnerabilities.
Sample Notice
This is a redacted sample report for a fictional company, Acme SaaS Pvt. Ltd., produced to demonstrate the structure, finding format, and compliance mapping of a Cybersecify Amazon SP-API Data Protection Policy engagement. The company, domains, addresses, identifiers, and findings are illustrative and do not describe any real client or assessment.
Take the report with you
The typeset PDF is the same document rendered above, including the page furniture a reviewer sees. The web application report from the same engagement, and the rest of the set, are on the SP-API sample index.