Cloud Security Assessment Report

The cloud scope from engagement 2026-09-ACM, published in full below. An authenticated, read only configuration review of an AWS account and an Amazon EKS cluster, run in support of an Amazon Selling Partner API Data Protection Policy submission. 12 findings, each scored under CVSS v3.1 and v4.0 and cited against a numbered DPP requirement.

This is a redacted sample from a real engagement. The client, Acme SaaS Pvt. Ltd., is fictional. The AWS account identifiers shown, 111122223333 and 222233334444, are Amazon's own documentation placeholders and belong to nobody.

Read this first

This is a redacted sample of a report from a real engagement. The client, Acme SaaS Pvt. Ltd., is fictional, and the company, domains, addresses and identifiers are illustrative. The AWS account identifiers 111122223333 and 222233334444 are Amazon's own documentation placeholders, not real accounts. Findings, severities, methodology and remediation guidance reflect the actual work. The full PDF is available to download.

Confidential

Cloud Security Assessment Report

Acme SaaS Pvt. Ltd., AWS and Amazon EKS Configuration Review

Prepared for Acme SaaS Pvt. Ltd.

Prepared by Cyber Secify Consulting (OPC) Private Limited

Lead Tester Rathnakara GN, OSCP (OS-101-34173)

Report v1.0  ·  19 September 2026  ·  Engagement 2026-09-ACM

Engagement Window 1 September to 19 September 2026

Account AWS 111122223333  ·  us-east-1

Cluster Amazon EKS: acme-eks

Classification Confidential, For Acme SaaS and Cybersecify only

This document contains confidential and proprietary information. Neither this document nor the information herein may be reproduced, used, or disclosed to or for the benefit of any third party without the prior written consent of Cyber Secify Consulting (OPC) Private Limited. This is a redacted sample containing fictional data.

Field Detail
Document TitleAcme SaaS Cloud Security Assessment Report
ClientAcme SaaS Pvt. Ltd.
Assessment ScopeAWS account and Amazon EKS cluster configuration
Engagement Reference2026-09-ACM
Version1.0 (First Issue)
Report Date19 September 2026
Engagement Window1 September to 19 September 2026
Prepared ByRathnakara GN, OSCP (OS-101-34173), Lead Assessor
Reviewed ByAshok Kamat, Chief Executive Officer, Cybersecify
ClassificationConfidential, For Acme SaaS and Cybersecify only
DistributionDaniel Reyes, Priya Nair (Acme SaaS); assessment team (Cybersecify)

Table of Contents

  1. Executive Summary Overall risk, key statistics
  2. Scope and Methodology Assets, standards, tools, risk ratings
  3. Findings Summary All 12 findings, CVSS scoring, status
  4. Detailed Findings 4 written up in full, 12 listed
  5. Test Cases Control tested, DPP section, result
  6. Compliance Evidence Package DPP, SOC 2 and ISO 27001:2022 coverage
  7. Programme Appendix Finding to DPP control mapping
  8. Appendix Team, distribution, glossary
  9. Disclaimer Limitations and sample notice
Section 1

Executive Summary

Cybersecify performed a configuration review of Acme SaaS's AWS account and Amazon EKS cluster in support of the Amazon SP-API Data Protection Policy submission. The review covered where Amazon Information is stored, who and what can reach it, where copies of it travel, how long it is kept, and which third parties receive it.

The perimeter and cryptography are in good order. The edge firewall enforces, transport is encrypted end to end, data at rest is encrypted under customer managed keys, MFA is universal and the root account is dormant. The findings are not about those controls; they are about copies of Amazon data that sit outside their reach.

Two conditions are severe. The bucket holding nightly order exports carries a wildcard principal, so any AWS account holder can read and overwrite files containing buyer names, addresses and order detail. Separately, a snapshot of the production order database is restored into the development account on a schedule, putting live buyer records in front of fourteen engineers in an environment with none of the production monitoring. Two further items are high: an administrative access key that has been active for 412 days, and buyer data forwarded to an observability provider that has never been assessed.

Overall Risk
Critical

The platform controls are largely well built, but two conditions place Amazon buyer data outside the boundary those controls defend: an export bucket any AWS account can read and write, and a live copy of the production order database running in the development account. Either alone would block the submission. Both must be closed and retested before the Letter of Attestation is issued.

Key Statistics

12
Total
2
Critical
2
High
4
Medium
2
Low
2
Info

Business Impact Summary

The pattern across these findings is that Amazon Information has escaped the environment built to protect it. The export bucket moves it outside the account entirely, the development restore moves it outside the production control set, the cross region replication moves it outside the registered country, and the observability and model providers move it outside the assessed supply chain. None of these requires an attacker to defeat a control; each is a copy made deliberately for an operational reason, with the protection left behind. Retention compounds it: three years of buyer records are held where thirty days would do, so any one of these paths exposes far more than it needs to.

Section 2

Scope and Methodology

This was an authenticated configuration review of the AWS account and Amazon EKS cluster using a read only role. No destructive actions were performed and no production data was exported. Findings are drawn from the observed configuration state during the engagement window.

In Scope Assets

Area Detail
AWS account111122223333 (us-east-1)
KubernetesAmazon EKS cluster acme-eks, workloads, secrets and network policy configuration
EdgeApplication Load Balancer and web application firewall association
Data at restEBS, persistent volumes, RDS and cache encryption posture
IdentityIAM users, roles, policies and MFA posture
LoggingCloudTrail, VPC Flow Logs and related monitoring configuration

Out of Scope

Destructive or availability affecting testing; changes to production configuration; exploitation of third party managed services beyond observing their configuration; application layer testing, which is covered in the separate web application report.

Methodology and Standards

Standard Application
CVSS v3.1 and v4.0Dual scoring on every finding with full vector strings.
CWERoot cause classification on every finding.
CIS AWS Foundations BenchmarkAccount level configuration baseline.
CIS Amazon EKS BenchmarkCluster and workload configuration baseline.
Amazon SP-API DPP Every finding cited against the published Data Protection Policy: Section 1 General Security Requirements and Section 2 Additional Security Requirements Specific to PII.

Tools

Tool Version Purpose
AWS CLIv2.36Authenticated read only inspection of account configuration and IAM.
kubectlv1.37.0Inspection of cluster workloads, secrets, service accounts and network policies.
Prowlerv5.14Automated AWS configuration checks against CIS benchmarks.
kube-benchv0.13Automated EKS configuration checks against the CIS Kubernetes benchmark.
ScoutSuitev5.14Cross service AWS posture review and reporting.

Testing Approach

Authenticated, read only configuration review of the AWS account and the Amazon EKS cluster. Automated benchmark tooling was used for breadth and every reported finding was manually verified against the live configuration. No destructive actions were performed and no production data was exported.

Risk Rating Definitions

Severity is assigned from the CVSS v3.1 base score. Ratings describe the risk the condition presents in this environment, not a generic product rating.

Rating CVSS v3.1 Definition
Critical 9.0 to 10.0 Direct, reliable compromise of Amazon information or of the platform holding it. Requires immediate containment ahead of any other remediation work.
High 7.0 to 8.9 A practical attack path to sensitive data or to administrative control, requiring no unusual preconditions. Remediate within one sprint.
Medium 4.0 to 6.9 A real weakness that needs a further condition, an existing foothold, or a chained finding to be exploited, or that materially weakens a control Amazon requires. Remediate within two sprints.
Low 0.1 to 3.9 Limited direct impact. Typically a defence in depth, logging, or hardening gap that raises cost and difficulty for an attacker once resolved. Address in the next hardening cycle.
Info 0.0 No vulnerability. An observation recorded because it affects the security posture or the evidence available to an assessor.

Deliverables and Retest

This v1.0 report is the report of record for its scope. A full retest of every finding is carried out within 30 calendar days of delivery. The v2.0 retest report, showing each finding as closed, partially closed, or accepted as a documented risk, is issued within 3 business days of the retest completing. A Letter of Attestation, signed by the OSCP certified lead tester, follows the retest and confirms that an independent manual penetration test was performed to Amazon's requirements. The Letter is supporting evidence for the SP-API Data Protection Policy submission and is not a certification.

Policy Basis for the Mapping

Every DPP citation in this report refers to a numbered requirement in the Amazon Data Protection Policy as published: Section 1, General Security Requirements (1.1 Network Protection through 1.7 Request for Deletion or Return), and Section 2, Additional Security Requirements Specific to Personally Identifiable Information (2.1 Data Retention through 2.7 Vulnerability Management). No control domain is inferred or renumbered. Where a finding touches more than one requirement, each is cited.

Amazon Required Report Elements

This report is structured to cover the six elements Amazon expects of a penetration test report submitted in support of SP-API DPP approval. Amazon reviews and decides on the submission; this report is independent, third party evidence and not an approval.

# Required Element Where It Is Covered
1Executive summary with overall risk rating and severity breakdownSection 1
2Testing methodology and scope coverageSection 2
3Findings classified by severity using CVSS v3.1 and v4.0Sections 3 and 4
4Tool output and manual verification evidenceSection 4, Evidence on every finding
5Remediation guidance with status trackingSections 3 and 4
6Compliance mapping to the applicable control domainsSection 6
Section 3

Findings Summary

The assessment produced 12 findings: 2 Critical, 2 High, 4 Medium, 2 Low and 2 Informational. Four are grouped as P1 because each of them, on its own, places Amazon Information outside the control set that the submission attests to.

Severity Distribution

Severity Count CVSS Range Remediation Priority
Critical 2 9.0 to 10.0 Immediate (P0)
High 2 7.0 to 8.9 Within 1 sprint
Medium 4 4.0 to 6.9 Within 2 sprints
Low 2 0.1 to 3.9 Next hardening cycle
Info 2 0.0 Best practice recommendation

All Findings

DPP Priority Finding ID Title Test Case Severity CVSS v3.1 CVSS v4.0 Status
P1 CS-2026-C01 Exported Order Reports Readable and Writable by Any AWS Account TC-01 Critical 9.1 9.2 Open
P1 CS-2026-C02 Production Amazon PII Restored into the Non-Production Account TC-02 Critical 9.6 9.3 Open
P1 CS-2026-C03 Long-Lived Access Key with AdministratorAccess Active for 412 Days TC-03 High 8.8 8.5 Open
P1 CS-2026-C04 Buyer PII Forwarded to an Unassessed Third-Party Observability Provider TC-04 High 7.5 7.7 Open
P2 CS-2026-C05 Amazon Information Replicated to a Region Outside the Registered Country TC-05 Medium 6.8 6.4 Open
P2 CS-2026-C06 No Deletion Controls for Amazon Information Past the Thirty Day Window TC-06 Medium 5.8 6.0 Open
P2 CS-2026-C07 No Data Loss Prevention or Egress Controls on the Account TC-07 Medium 5.3 5.6 Open
P2 CS-2026-C08 Amazon Information Not Tagged or Logically Separated from Other Data TC-08 Medium 4.4 4.8 Open
P3 CS-2026-C09 Incident Response Plan Omits the Amazon Notification Path TC-09 Low 3.9 3.6 Open
P3 CS-2026-C10 No Configuration Baseline or Drift Detection for Account Resources TC-10 Low 3.0 2.7 Open
P3 CS-2026-C11 No Monitoring for Exposed Credentials on External Sources TC-11 Info 0.0 0.0 Open
P3 CS-2026-C12 Order Text Passed to a Third Party Language Model Without Documented Review TC-12 Info 0.0 0.0 Open

This is a redacted sample. The table above lists the full finding set by title; Section 4 gives complete write ups for a representative finding in each priority band (P1, P2, P3) and across the severity range, so the reader can see the exact format, evidence, and Amazon DPP mapping without reproducing every finding. A real engagement report details every finding in full.

Priority Definitions

Findings are grouped by remediation priority for the Amazon SP-API Data Protection Policy submission. P1 findings block the submission and must be remediated and retested before the Letter of Attestation is issued. P2 findings are DPP relevant but not submission blocking; they strengthen the attestation and should be remediated on the stated timeline. P3 findings are lower priority hardening items that improve the overall security posture and are addressed in the normal hardening cycle.

Section 4

Detailed Findings

All 12 findings are listed below in their priority bands. Four carry the complete write up the source report publishes: CS-2026-C01 and CS-2026-C02 from P1, CS-2026-C06 from P2 and CS-2026-C12 from P3. The other eight carry the severity, both CVSS scores, the test case and the DPP mapping the report records for them, and are marked where the write up is not reproduced in this redacted sample.

P1 · DPP Submission Blockers

Finding 1 · CS-2026-C01 · Data Exposure

Exported Order Reports Readable and Writable by Any AWS Account

P1 · Open
Severity Critical
Status Open
CVSS v3.1 9.1 (Critical)
CVSS v3.1 Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
CVSS v4.0 9.2 (Critical)
CVSS v4.0 Vector CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
CWE CWE-284 Improper Access Control, CWE-732 Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource
OWASP Category N/A (cloud configuration)
Test Case CLOUD-DATA-02 object store access policy
Affected Endpoints / Assets S3 bucket acme-order-exports in account 111122223333
Description

The bucket that holds nightly exports of Amazon order reports carries a policy statement whose principal is a wildcard, scoped only by an aws:PrincipalType condition. Any authenticated AWS principal in any account can therefore both read and overwrite the exported objects. The exports contain buyer names, shipping addresses and order line detail derived from the SP-API.

Steps to Reproduce
  1. Enumerate the buckets that receive report exports and retrieve each bucket policy.
  2. Confirm the policy statement principal is a wildcard rather than a named account, role or organisation identifier.
  3. Confirm the statement grants both read and write actions on the export prefix.
  4. Confirm from an unrelated principal that the objects are retrievable and that the Block Public Access account setting does not constrain cross account principals.
Evidence
Command Output
aws s3api get-bucket-policy --bucket acme-order-exports
  Statement: Principal "*" | Action [s3:GetObject, s3:PutObject] | Resource arn:aws:s3:::acme-order-exports/exports/*
aws s3api get-public-access-block --bucket acme-order-exports
  BlockPublicPolicy: true   (does not restrict cross account principals granted by policy)
Business Impact

Amazon buyer data leaves the account boundary entirely. Any AWS account holder who learns or guesses the bucket name can download every export, and the write permission allows an attacker to replace an export with altered content that downstream reconciliation would then treat as authoritative. This is a data breach path that requires no credential compromise at Acme SaaS.

Why Amazon Cares

Uncontrolled access to Amazon Information is the condition the DPP exists to prevent. A wildcard principal on a bucket holding buyer PII fails DPP 1.1, which requires public access to be restricted to approved users, and DPP 1.3, which requires access on a need to know basis, and would be treated as a disqualifying finding rather than a gap to be scheduled.

Remediation

Replace the wildcard principal with an explicit list of account or organisation identifiers, or remove the cross account grant entirely and serve the exports through a pre signed URL with a short expiry. Enable BlockPublicAccess at the account level, turn on IAM Access Analyzer for external access findings on every bucket holding Amazon data, and review CloudTrail data events for the export prefix to establish whether the objects were retrieved by an unknown principal.

Compliance Mapping
Framework Control / Relevance
SOC 2 (TSC)CC6.1 logical access, CC6.3 least privilege, CC6.6 boundary protection
ISO 27001:2022A.5.15 Access control, A.8.3 Information access restriction, A.5.34 PII protection
MITRE ATT&CKT1530 Data from Cloud Storage Object
Amazon DPPDPP 1.1 Network Protection, DPP 1.3 Least Privilege Principle
Finding 2 · CS-2026-C02 · Environment Separation

Production Amazon PII Restored into the Non-Production Account

P1 · Open
Severity Critical
Status Open
CVSS v3.1 9.6 (Critical)
CVSS v3.1 Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
CVSS v4.0 9.3 (Critical)
CVSS v4.0 Vector CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N
CWE CWE-1258 Exposure of Sensitive System Information Due to Uncleared Debug Information, CWE-359 Exposure of Private Personal Information
OWASP Category N/A (cloud configuration)
Test Case CLOUD-ENV-01 production data in non-production
Affected Endpoints / Assets RDS instance acme-dev-orders in the development account
Description

A snapshot of the production order database is restored on a recurring schedule into the development account so that engineers can test against realistic data. The restored instance holds live buyer names, addresses, contact details and order history derived from the SP-API. Every member of the developer IAM group in that account holds read access to it, and the development account does not carry the logging, alerting or network controls applied to production.

Steps to Reproduce
  1. List the RDS instances in the development account and identify those restored from a production snapshot.
  2. Confirm the restored instance carries buyer records rather than synthetic or masked data.
  3. Enumerate the IAM principals that can reach the instance and confirm the developer group is among them.
  4. Compare the control set on the development account against production: logging, alerting, network isolation and session recording.
Evidence
Command Output
aws rds describe-db-instances --profile dev
  acme-dev-orders   restored from: arn:aws:rds:...:snapshot:prod-orders-nightly
aws rds describe-db-snapshots --profile dev --query 'DBSnapshots[].SourceRegion'
  source: production account 222233334444
  developer group policy: rds-db:connect on acme-dev-orders   (14 principals)
Business Impact

The population of people and systems that can reach Amazon buyer data is far larger than the production access list implies, and it sits in an account that is monitored less closely. A compromise of any developer credential, or of any workload in the development account, reaches the same buyer records that production protects carefully. The production access controls are, in effect, bypassed by a copy.

Why Amazon Cares

The DPP expects Amazon Information to be confined to the systems that need it and to be handled under the same controls wherever it exists. Using live buyer data to populate a non production environment contradicts DPP 2.5, which requires separate test and production environments, and DPP 1.3, which grants access on a need to know basis, and it is the kind of finding that blocks a submission on its own.

Remediation

Stop restoring production snapshots into the development account. Generate the development dataset by masking or synthesising the buyer fields, and where realistic volumes are needed, use record counts and value distributions rather than real values. Delete the existing restored instances and their snapshots, revoke the cross account snapshot share, and add a preventive control (a service control policy or an automated check) that fails any restore of a production snapshot outside the production account.

Compliance Mapping
Framework Control / Relevance
SOC 2 (TSC)CC6.1 logical access, CC6.3 least privilege, CC8.1 change management
ISO 27001:2022A.8.31 Separation of environments, A.8.33 Test information, A.5.34 PII protection
MITRE ATT&CKT1213 Data from Information Repositories
Amazon DPPDPP 2.5 Secure Coding Practices, DPP 1.3 Least Privilege Principle
CS-2026-C03

Long-Lived Access Key with AdministratorAccess Active for 412 Days

P1 · Open
Severity High
Status Open
CVSS v3.1 8.8 (High)
CVSS v4.0 8.5
Test Case TC-03 · Verify age, scope and rotation of programmatic credentials
Target IAM
Amazon DPP DPP 1.4 / DPP 1.2
DPP Impact Programmatic credential exceeds the rotation period and remains privileged

The description, steps to reproduce, evidence, business impact and remediation for this finding are not reproduced in this redacted sample. A real engagement report details every finding in full, in the format shown above.

CS-2026-C04

Buyer PII Forwarded to an Unassessed Third-Party Observability Provider

P1 · Open
Severity High
Status Open
CVSS v3.1 7.5 (High)
CVSS v4.0 7.7
Test Case TC-04 · Verify the processing record covers every party receiving Amazon data
Target Egress
Amazon DPP DPP 2.2 / DPP 1.3
DPP Impact Processing record omits a party that receives Amazon Information

The description, steps to reproduce, evidence, business impact and remediation for this finding are not reproduced in this redacted sample. A real engagement report details every finding in full, in the format shown above.

P2 · Attestation Strengthening Findings

CS-2026-C05

Amazon Information Replicated to a Region Outside the Registered Country

P2 · Open
Severity Medium
Status Open
CVSS v3.1 6.8 (Medium)
CVSS v4.0 6.4
Test Case TC-05 · Verify replication targets against applicable privacy and regulatory requirements
Target S3 / RDS
Amazon DPP DPP 2.2
DPP Impact Replication target not assessed against applicable privacy regulation

The description, steps to reproduce, evidence, business impact and remediation for this finding are not reproduced in this redacted sample. A real engagement report details every finding in full, in the format shown above.

Finding 3 · CS-2026-C06 · Data Retention

No Deletion Controls for Amazon Information Past the Thirty Day Window

P2 · Open
Severity Medium
Status Open
CVSS v3.1 5.8 (Medium)
CVSS v3.1 Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
CVSS v4.0 6.0 (Medium)
CVSS v4.0 Vector CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N
CWE CWE-459 Incomplete Cleanup, CWE-359 Exposure of Private Personal Information
OWASP Category N/A (cloud configuration)
Test Case CLOUD-DATA-03 retention and deletion
Affected Endpoints / Assets RDS orders schema and S3 prefix exports/ in account 111122223333
Description

Buyer personally identifiable information derived from the SP-API is retained indefinitely. The orders schema holds buyer name, address and contact fields for orders fulfilled more than three years ago, the export prefix has no lifecycle configuration, and there is no scheduled job, database policy or object expiry rule that removes buyer PII once the retention window has passed.

Steps to Reproduce
  1. Query the earliest fulfilment date present in the orders schema and confirm buyer PII fields are still populated for it.
  2. Retrieve the lifecycle configuration for every prefix holding exported order data.
  3. Search the account for scheduled tasks, Lambda functions or database jobs that perform a retention purge.
  4. Confirm no separate archive holds the data under a documented legal or tax retention basis.
Evidence
Command and Query Output
aws s3api get-bucket-lifecycle-configuration --bucket acme-order-exports
  NoSuchLifecycleConfiguration
SELECT MIN(fulfilled_at), COUNT(*) FROM orders WHERE buyer_email IS NOT NULL;
  2023-02-11 | 1,284,663    (buyer PII retained on fulfilled orders beyond three years)
Business Impact

Every record retained past the point of business need enlarges the consequence of any future breach without adding value. The volume held here means an incident that would otherwise expose a month of orders instead exposes three years of them, and it puts the environment outside the retention rule the policy sets rather than inside it.

Why Amazon Cares

DPP 2.1 is explicit: PII is retained no longer than thirty days after order delivery, and only to fulfil orders, calculate and remit taxes, produce tax invoices, or meet a legal requirement. Where a tax or regulatory obligation does apply, the policy requires the archive to be held cold or offline rather than live. Indefinite retention in a live database meets neither condition, and DPP 1.7 further requires that Information can be deleted on request within 72 hours, which is not achievable without a deletion mechanism.

Remediation

Define the retention basis for each field rather than for the record as a whole, so that tax relevant fields can be kept while buyer contact fields are removed. Implement deletion as an automated job with a log of what was removed and when, apply an S3 lifecycle rule to the export prefix, and add a monthly control check that reports any buyer PII older than the retention window. Backfill the deletion across the existing data once the job is proven on a subset.

Compliance Mapping
Framework Control / Relevance
SOC 2 (TSC)CC6.5 disposal of data, P4.3 retention and disposal
ISO 27001:2022A.5.33 Protection of records, A.5.34 PII protection, A.8.10 Information deletion
MITRE ATT&CKN/A (data governance condition, no adversary technique)
Amazon DPPDPP 2.1 Data Retention, DPP 1.7 Request for Deletion or Return
CS-2026-C07

No Data Loss Prevention or Egress Controls on the Account

P2 · Open
Severity Medium
Status Open
CVSS v3.1 5.3 (Medium)
CVSS v4.0 5.6
Test Case TC-07 · Verify alarms detect Information leaving its protected boundary
Target VPC
Amazon DPP DPP 2.6
DPP Impact No alarm detects Information extracted from its protected boundary

The description, steps to reproduce, evidence, business impact and remediation for this finding are not reproduced in this redacted sample. A real engagement report details every finding in full, in the format shown above.

CS-2026-C08

Amazon Information Not Tagged or Logically Separated from Other Data

P2 · Open
Severity Medium
Status Open
CVSS v3.1 4.4 (Medium)
CVSS v4.0 4.8
Test Case TC-08 · Verify Amazon Information is inventoried and identifiable
Target Account
Amazon DPP DPP 2.3 / DPP 2.2
DPP Impact Amazon Information is not inventoried or identifiable for handling

The description, steps to reproduce, evidence, business impact and remediation for this finding are not reproduced in this redacted sample. A real engagement report details every finding in full, in the format shown above.

P3 · Lower Priority Hardening Findings

CS-2026-C09

Incident Response Plan Omits the Amazon Notification Path

P3 · Open
Severity Low
Status Open
CVSS v3.1 3.9 (Low)
CVSS v4.0 3.6
Test Case TC-09 · Verify the incident response plan defines escalation to Amazon within 24 hours
Target Process
Amazon DPP DPP 1.6
DPP Impact Plan omits escalation to Amazon within the 24 hour window

The description, steps to reproduce, evidence, business impact and remediation for this finding are not reproduced in this redacted sample. A real engagement report details every finding in full, in the format shown above.

CS-2026-C10

No Configuration Baseline or Drift Detection for Account Resources

P3 · Open
Severity Low
Status Open
CVSS v3.1 3.0 (Low)
CVSS v4.0 2.7
Test Case TC-10 · Verify changes to systems holding PII are tested, approved and restricted
Target Account
Amazon DPP DPP 2.7 / DPP 2.3
DPP Impact Changes to systems holding PII are not tested, approved or restricted

The description, steps to reproduce, evidence, business impact and remediation for this finding are not reproduced in this redacted sample. A real engagement report details every finding in full, in the format shown above.

CS-2026-C11

No Monitoring for Exposed Credentials on External Sources

P3 · Open
Severity Info
Status Open
CVSS v3.1 0.0 (Info)
CVSS v4.0 0.0
Test Case TC-11 · Verify credentials are not exposed in public repositories or external sources
Target Process
Amazon DPP DPP 2.5
DPP Impact Credential exposure in public sources would not be detected

The description, steps to reproduce, evidence, business impact and remediation for this finding are not reproduced in this redacted sample. A real engagement report details every finding in full, in the format shown above.

Finding 4 · CS-2026-C12 · AI and ML Data Usage

Order Text Passed to a Third Party Language Model Without Documented Review

P3 · Open
Severity Info
Status Open
CVSS v3.1 0.0 (Info)
CVSS v3.1 Vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N
CVSS v4.0 0.0 (Info)
CVSS v4.0 Vector CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
CWE CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
OWASP Category N/A (cloud configuration)
Test Case CLOUD-AI-01 model data usage
Affected Endpoints / Assets Support summarisation service in the acme-eks cluster
Description

The support summarisation service sends buyer message threads and order notes to a third party language model endpoint to generate case summaries. The outbound payload was observed to carry the raw message body, which can include buyer names and address fragments. There is no record of a review covering what the provider retains, whether the payload is used for model training, or which contractual terms apply.

Steps to Reproduce
  1. Identify the workloads in the cluster that call an external model endpoint.
  2. Capture the outbound request shape and confirm whether buyer fields are redacted before transmission.
  3. Check for a documented assessment of the provider and for terms covering retention and training use.
  4. Confirm whether the provider appears in the third party inventory shared with Amazon.
Evidence
Command Output
kubectl get deploy support-summariser -o jsonpath='{.spec...env}'
  MODEL_ENDPOINT=https://api.<provider>.example/v1/responses
  request body: { "input": "<raw buyer message thread>" }    (no redaction step observed)
Business Impact

Amazon derived content leaves the environment to a party that is not in the assessed inventory and under terms that have not been reviewed. Whether that is acceptable depends entirely on the provider terms and on what is actually sent, neither of which is currently established, so the exposure cannot be sized. It is recorded as informational because no loss has been demonstrated, not because the question is closed.

Remediation

Redact buyer identifiers before the payload leaves the cluster, so the model receives the message content without the personal fields. Record the provider in the third party inventory, obtain terms that exclude the data from training and define a retention period, and complete the same supplier assessment applied to other processors of Amazon Information. Record the provider and the data fields it receives in the processing record required by DPP 2.2.

Compliance Mapping
Framework Control / Relevance
SOC 2 (TSC)CC9.2 vendor and business partner management
ISO 27001:2022A.5.19 Information security in supplier relationships, A.5.34 PII protection
MITRE ATT&CKT1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service
Amazon DPPDPP 2.2 Data Governance, DPP 1.3 Least Privilege Principle
Section 5

Test Cases

Each test case maps to the assessed control and the finding that resulted. Every case below returned a FAIL and corresponds to a confirmed finding; controls confirmed working are recorded in the Compliance Evidence Package.

TC # Test Case Target DPP § Result Finding
TC-01Verify no cross account or wildcard principal on stores holding Amazon dataS31.1 / 1.3FAILCS-2026-C01
TC-02Verify production Amazon data is not present in non-production environmentsRDS2.5FAILCS-2026-C02
TC-03Verify age, scope and rotation of programmatic credentialsIAM1.4FAILCS-2026-C03
TC-04Verify the processing record covers every party receiving Amazon dataEgress2.2FAILCS-2026-C04
TC-05Verify replication targets against applicable privacy and regulatory requirementsS3 / RDS2.2FAILCS-2026-C05
TC-06Verify PII is deleted within thirty days of order deliveryRDS / S32.1FAILCS-2026-C06
TC-07Verify alarms detect Information leaving its protected boundaryVPC2.6FAILCS-2026-C07
TC-08Verify Amazon Information is inventoried and identifiableAccount2.3FAILCS-2026-C08
TC-09Verify the incident response plan defines escalation to Amazon within 24 hoursProcess1.6FAILCS-2026-C09
TC-10Verify changes to systems holding PII are tested, approved and restrictedAccount2.7FAILCS-2026-C10
TC-11Verify credentials are not exposed in public repositories or external sourcesProcess2.5FAILCS-2026-C11
TC-12Verify parties receiving Amazon data are recorded and the payload is minimisedEKS2.2FAILCS-2026-C12
Section 6

Compliance Evidence Package

This section maps findings and positive controls to the published Amazon Data Protection Policy, the SOC 2 Trust Services Criteria, and ISO 27001:2022 Annex A. Every DPP citation in this report refers to a numbered requirement in the policy as published by Amazon: Section 1, General Security Requirements, and Section 2, Additional Security Requirements Specific to Personally Identifiable Information. The table below covers all fourteen requirements, not only those where a finding was raised. This assessment is independent evaluation evidence. Cybersecify is not a CPA firm and does not perform the SOC 2 examination, is not ISO 27001 or SOC 2 certified, and does not approve the DPP submission.

A. Positive Controls Confirmed

Domain Evidence
Edge ProtectionAn enforcing web application firewall is associated with every internet facing load balancer, with rule groups in block mode.
Encryption in TransitTLS 1.2 or better is enforced at the edge and between services; plaintext listeners are absent.
Encryption at RestVolumes, databases and object storage are encrypted, with customer managed keys on the stores holding Amazon data.
IdentityMFA is enforced on every console user and the root account is dormant with no access keys.
Audit LoggingAccount wide CloudTrail is enabled with log file validation and delivers to a protected trail.
Vulnerability ManagementContinuous scanning is enabled across compute and images, and this assessment supplies the annual test.

B. Amazon DPP Section Coverage

DPP § Requirement Status Basis
1.1Network ProtectionGapPublic access to the export bucket is not restricted to approved users (C01).
1.2Access ManagementPartialUnique IDs and account lockout are in place, but the quarterly access review has not removed a dormant privileged credential (C03).
1.3Least Privilege PrincipleGapNeed to know is not enforced on the exports, the development copy, or the third party feed (C01, C02, C04).
1.4Credential ManagementGapAn administrative access key has not been rotated within the twelve month period (C03).
1.5Encryption in TransitMetTLS 1.2 or better is enforced on all internal and external endpoints.
1.6Incident Response PlanPartialA plan exists but defines no escalation path to Amazon and has not been reviewed within six months (C09).
1.7Request for Deletion or ReturnPartialNo mechanism exists to delete Information on request within 72 hours (C06).
2.1Data RetentionGapPII is held live for more than three years after order delivery (C06).
2.2Data GovernanceGapThe processing record omits two recipients and does not cover the replication target (C04, C05, C08, C12).
2.3Asset ManagementPartialAn asset inventory exists but does not identify which systems hold PII (C08, C10).
2.4Encryption at RestMetAES-256 across volumes, databases and object storage, with key material restricted to service principals.
2.5Secure Coding PracticesGapTest and production environments are not separate for buyer data, and exposure of credentials in public sources is not monitored (C02, C11).
2.6Logging and MonitoringPartialLogging and retention meet the standard, but no alarm detects Information leaving its protected boundary (C07).
2.7Vulnerability ManagementPartialScanning and this test satisfy the 180 day requirement, but changes to systems holding PII are not controlled (C10).

C. SOC 2 Trust Services Criteria Coverage

Criterion Description Findings
CC6.1Logical access and data protectionC01, C02, C03
CC6.3Least privilegeC01, C02
CC6.5Disposal of dataC06
CC7.2Detection and preventionC07, C11
CC7.4Incident responseC09
CC8.1Change and configuration managementC08, C10
CC9.2Vendor and business partner managementC04, C12

D. ISO 27001:2022 Annex A Coverage

Control Description Findings
A.5.15Access controlC01, C02, C03
A.5.19Supplier relationshipsC04, C12
A.5.26Response to information security incidentsC09
A.5.34Privacy and protection of PIIC01, C02, C05, C06
A.8.10Information deletionC06
A.8.9Configuration managementC08, C10
A.8.12Data leakage preventionC07
A.8.31Separation of environmentsC02
Section 7

Programme Appendix

Finding to DPP control mapping and priority band coverage for the SP-API Data Protection Policy submission programme.

Finding Severity DPP § DPP Impact
CS-2026-C01Critical1.1 / 1.3Public access to Amazon exports is not restricted to approved users
CS-2026-C02Critical2.5 / 1.3Test and production environments are not separate for buyer data
CS-2026-C03High1.4 / 1.2Programmatic credential exceeds the rotation period and remains privileged
CS-2026-C04High2.2 / 1.3Processing record omits a party that receives Amazon Information
CS-2026-C05Medium2.2Replication target not assessed against applicable privacy regulation
CS-2026-C06Medium2.1 / 1.7PII held live beyond thirty days after delivery, no deletion path
CS-2026-C07Medium2.6No alarm detects Information extracted from its protected boundary
CS-2026-C08Medium2.3 / 2.2Amazon Information is not inventoried or identifiable for handling
CS-2026-C09Low1.6Plan omits escalation to Amazon within the 24 hour window
CS-2026-C10Low2.7 / 2.3Changes to systems holding PII are not tested, approved or restricted
CS-2026-C11Info2.5Credential exposure in public sources would not be detected
CS-2026-C12Info2.2Model provider receives Amazon content outside the processing record
Section 8

Appendix

A. Testing Team and Authorisation

Assessor Role Credentials
Rathnakara GNLead AssessorOSCP (OS-101-34173)

Certification verifiable via the assessor's Credly badge issued by OffSec.

B. Report Distribution

Recipient Organisation Copy
Daniel ReyesAcme SaaS Pvt. Ltd.Electronic
Priya NairAcme SaaS Pvt. Ltd.Electronic
Rathnakara GNCyber Secify Consulting (OPC) Private LimitedElectronic
Ashok KamatCyber Secify Consulting (OPC) Private LimitedElectronic

C. Glossary

Term Definition
ALBApplication Load Balancer, the AWS layer 7 load balancer that terminates TLS and routes traffic to backend targets.
CVSSCommon Vulnerability Scoring System. A 0 to 10 severity score with a vector string; this report uses v3.1 and v4.0.
EKSAmazon Elastic Kubernetes Service, a managed Kubernetes control plane.
IRSAIAM Roles for Service Accounts, a mechanism to issue scoped, short lived AWS credentials to Kubernetes workloads.
NetworkPolicyA Kubernetes resource that restricts network traffic between workloads.
VPC Flow LogsA record of accepted and rejected network flows in an AWS virtual private cloud.
WAFWeb Application Firewall, an enforcing filter in front of web traffic; count mode observes without blocking.
Section 9

Disclaimer

Limitations of Testing

Penetration testing is inherently limited by the scope, time, and resources allocated to the engagement. No individual or organisation can guarantee identifying all security issues. The testing performed is conducted on a best effort basis, and the findings reported herein are specific to the environment provided for testing.

Scope of Findings

The reported findings apply exclusively to the tested environment and configurations during testing. Information systems rely on human factors and can be inherently vulnerable to human error. While Cybersecify has endeavoured to identify significant security vulnerabilities in the analysed systems, it is impossible to assure that all potential vulnerabilities have been discovered. This document does not constitute legal advice.

Continued Vigilance

Security is an ongoing process. Regular assessments and updates to security measures are essential to maintaining a strong security posture. Cybersecify recommends periodic penetration testing and continuous monitoring to adapt to new threats and vulnerabilities.

Sample Notice

This is a redacted sample report for a fictional company, Acme SaaS Pvt. Ltd., produced to demonstrate the structure, finding format, and compliance mapping of a Cybersecify Amazon SP-API Data Protection Policy engagement. The company, domains, addresses, identifiers, and findings are illustrative and do not describe any real client or assessment.

Cyber Secify Consulting (OPC) Private Limited  ·  contact@cybersecify.com  ·  Bengaluru, India

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