iOS Application Penetration Testing

iOS application penetration testing is a security assessment of your IPA that covers Keychain storage, data protection classes, jailbreak detection bypass, URL scheme hijacking, and binary analysis using tools like Frida, Objection, and class-dump.

Yes. We test on both jailbroken and non-jailbroken devices to assess runtime manipulation risks and verify that jailbreak detection mechanisms are effective.

Cybersecify iOS pentest uses the standard MASTG-aligned iOS toolchain on a jailbroken iPhone (typically a sacrificial older device on iOS 16 or 17 with palera1n / checkra1n jailbreak; we also maintain a non-jailbroken device for parallel testing). Static analysis: class-dump (Objective-C class hierarchy from Mach-O binary), Hopper Disassembler or Ghidra (binary disassembly and decompilation including Swift code), MobSF (automated static analysis baseline), grep + binwalk on the unencrypted decrypted IPA (after Clutch or frida-ios-dump decryption). Dynamic analysis: Frida (runtime hooking, SSL pinning bypass, jailbreak detection bypass, Objective-C method hooking, Swift function hooking), Objection (Frida-based helper for keychain dumps, URL handler enumeration, filesystem browsing), Cycript (interactive runtime exploration on older targets), Burp Suite Pro (HTTPS proxy with Burp CA installed and trusted on the device). For non-jailbroken parallel testing we use the Network Extension framework and re-signed sideloaded IPA with debug entitlements.

iOS Keychain is the recommended sensitive-data store but its security depends on the data protection class chosen at write time. Cybersecify methodology: exercise the app through all user flows that should write to Keychain (login, biometric setup, refresh token storage, payment credentials), then dump Keychain entries from a jailbroken device using Objection (ios keychain dump) or the Apple-provided keychain_dumper. For each entry, verify the data protection class: kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlocked (correct for most user-bound secrets), kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlock (acceptable for background-required tokens), kSecAttrAccessibleAlways (red flag, accessible even before the device passcode is entered), or kSecAttrAccessibleAlwaysThisDeviceOnly variants. We also test the iOS sandbox NSUserDefaults, plist files in Documents/Library/Preferences/, Core Data sqlite stores, and the app caches/ directory for sensitive data that should have been Keychain-resident. Findings include exact Keychain item + data protection class + remediation (Keychain access control with kSecAttrAccessible + Secure Enclave-bound key for high-sensitivity flows like payment auth).

Jailbreak detection bypass is required to exercise the runtime attack surface on apps that block jailbroken devices at startup. Cybersecify approach: Liberty Lite or A-Bypass tweak for app-level jailbreak hiding (target app cannot enumerate /Applications/Cydia.app, /private/var/lib/apt/, jailbreak-only paths), Frida script for runtime patching of common jailbreak-check libraries (IOSSecuritySuite, jailbreak-detection cocoapod, custom file-existence checks), Objection one-liners for stock detection patterns (NSFileManager fileExistsAtPath: for /bin/bash, /usr/sbin/sshd, /etc/apt; fork() returns 0 check; ptrace anti-debug check). For apps using DeviceCheck or App Attest server-side verification, we document the limitation (server-side App Attest is the correct fix; client-side jailbreak checks are bypassable by design). We test on iOS 16 + iOS 17 jailbroken iPhones with palera1n. Bypass findings document the exact technique + recommended hardening (server-side App Attest + risk-based step-up auth).

Yes. SSL pinning bypass is required to intercept HTTPS traffic and exercise the API attack surface. Cybersecify approach: install Burp Suite CA via iOS Settings > General > VPN & Device Management > Profile > Trust Settings (required step Apple introduced in iOS 10+; certificate install alone is insufficient). Attempt direct HTTPS proxy. If pinning blocks (most apps using TrustKit or NSURLSession pinned-cert validation), apply Frida iOS-pinning-bypass script (SSL Kill Switch 3 by Nabla-c0d3 or community SSL bypass scripts targeting common iOS pinning libraries). For native pinning (BoringSSL or custom CFNetwork validation), hook the SecTrustEvaluate or SSLSetSessionOption functions at runtime via Frida. For App Transport Security (ATS) exceptions in Info.plist, we audit the NSAllowsArbitraryLoads, NSExceptionDomains, and NSIncludesSubdomains keys for over-broad cleartext exceptions. We document the bypass technique used + the recommendation (mutual TLS for high-sensitivity API endpoints).

Yes. URL scheme hijacking is a high-frequency finding category on iOS. Custom URL schemes (yourapp://) are first-come-first-served: any installed app can register the same scheme, and iOS calls the most-recently-installed handler when the user clicks a link with that scheme. Cybersecify methodology: enumerate registered URL schemes from Info.plist CFBundleURLTypes, attempt to invoke each scheme with attacker-controlled parameters (Safari with yourapp://payment?amount=1000&recipient=attacker), test whether the app validates the calling app, validates the parameters, or auto-executes sensitive actions without user confirmation. For Universal Links (apple-app-site-association), we verify the AASA file is served correctly and validate the entitlement scope. Findings include the exact attacker-controlled URL + the app behavior + remediation (require user confirmation for sensitive actions invoked via URL, validate caller via LSApplicationQueriesSchemes or the iOS 14+ Sender Application API).

Yes. Cybersecify iOS pentests follow OWASP Mobile Application Security Testing Guide (MASTG) v1.7+ as the methodology baseline and OWASP Mobile Application Security Verification Standard (MASVS) v2.1 as the verification standard. We cover the MASVS-STORAGE (Keychain + data protection classes), MASVS-CRYPTO (CryptoKit + CommonCrypto), MASVS-AUTH (Face ID + Touch ID + LocalAuthentication framework), MASVS-NETWORK (ATS + cert pinning), MASVS-PLATFORM (URL schemes + Universal Links + app extensions), MASVS-CODE (Swift + Objective-C secure coding), MASVS-RESILIENCE (jailbreak detection + anti-debug + anti-tamper), and MASVS-PRIVACY control categories. Reports cite MASTG test IDs per finding so engineering teams can cross-reference remediation guidance with the OWASP source. The Growth Pentest plan adds OWASP Mobile Top 10 (2024) cross-mapping per finding.

Single-scope iOS pentest at Cybersecify takes 7 calendar days under the Startup Pentest plan at INR 74,999 and covers one IPA (one app, one production build). A two-scope engagement (typically iOS + API, or iOS + Android for cross-platform apps) takes 10 calendar days under the Growth Pentest plan at INR 1,79,999 and includes SOC 2 + ISO 27001 audit-prep evidence with control mapping per finding. International pricing: Startup ~USD 900 / ~EUR 830, Growth ~USD 2,150 / ~EUR 1,990 at snapshot FX. Test device setup is on Cybersecify (jailbroken iPhone for runtime + non-jailbroken for parallel coverage; no buyer hardware shipment required). IPA file and test accounts are buyer responsibility. All iOS pentests include 1 free retest within 30 days of report delivery.

Yes. iOS pentest reports follow PTES + OWASP MASTG v1.7+ + OWASP MASVS v2.1. Reports identify findings that overlap App Store Review Guidelines (Section 2.5 Software Requirements, Section 5.1 Privacy, Section 5.2 Intellectual Property) so the engineering team can address App Store compliance alongside security findings before re-submission. The Growth Pentest plan adds SOC 2 Trust Services Criteria (CC6.1 Logical Access, CC6.7 Restricted Transmission, CC7.1 Vulnerability Detection) + ISO 27001 Annex A (A.8.8 Technical Vulnerabilities, A.8.26 Application Security Requirements, A.8.28 Secure Coding) control mapping per finding. Reports have been accepted by SOC 2 Type 1, Type 2, and ISO 27001 auditors for the mobile-app component of buyer audits. The Growth plan includes a Letter of Attestation signed by the Lead Pen Tester (OSCP) for App Store appeals or buyer security questionnaires.

Yes. Biometric authentication is a high-value attack surface because incorrect implementation can be trivially bypassed without breaking the biometric system itself. Cybersecify methodology: identify all flows that gate behind LocalAuthentication framework (LAContext evaluatePolicy: with LAPolicyDeviceOwnerAuthenticationWithBiometrics), test whether the authentication result is enforced server-side (a Frida hook returning success without prompting the user should NOT grant access; server should require a Keychain-resident token bound to Secure Enclave that requires biometric to access), test the fallback to passcode (LAPolicyDeviceOwnerAuthentication allows passcode fallback by default; high-sensitivity flows should disable fallback or require an additional factor), test biometry-change invalidation (kSecAccessControlBiometryAny vs kSecAccessControlBiometryCurrentSet, where current-set invalidates the Keychain entry when biometric enrollment changes, which is the correct setting for payment auth). Findings include the exact LAContext usage + remediation (Secure Enclave-bound key + LAErrorAuthenticationFailed handling + server-side step-up auth for high-sensitivity actions).