Network Penetration Test Report
The network scope from engagement 2026-09-ACM, rendered in full below. External and unauthenticated testing of the staging perimeter, the TLS posture at the edge, and the email authentication and transport security records for the sending domain. 6 findings: 3 Medium and 3 Informational, with no Critical or High.
This is a redacted sample taken from a real engagement, and the client is fictional. The company, domains, addresses and identifiers are illustrative. Hosts are drawn from the documentation ranges reserved by RFC 5737. The methodology, the finding format, the severity ratings and the compliance mapping reflect the actual work.
Network Security Assessment Report
Acme SaaS Pvt. Ltd., External Network and Email Security Posture
Prepared for Acme SaaS Pvt. Ltd.
Prepared by Cyber Secify Consulting (OPC) Private Limited
This document contains confidential and proprietary information. Neither this document nor the information herein may be reproduced, used, or disclosed to or for the benefit of any third party without the prior written consent of Cyber Secify Consulting (OPC) Private Limited. This is a redacted sample containing fictional data.
Document Control
| Field | Detail |
|---|---|
| Document Title | Acme SaaS Network Security Assessment Report |
| Client | Acme SaaS Pvt. Ltd. |
| Assessment Scope | External network and email security posture |
| Engagement Reference | 2026-09-ACM |
| Version | 1.0 (First Issue) |
| Report Date | 19 September 2026 |
| Engagement Window | 1 September to 19 September 2026 |
| Prepared By | Rathnakara GN, OSCP (OS-101-34173), Lead Assessor |
| Reviewed By | Ashok Kamat, Chief Executive Officer, Cybersecify |
| Classification | Confidential, For Acme SaaS and Cybersecify only |
| Distribution | Daniel Reyes, Priya Nair (Acme SaaS); assessment team (Cybersecify) |
Table of Contents
- Executive Summary Overall risk, statistics, business impact
- Scope and Methodology Assets, standards, tools, risk ratings
- Findings Summary Severity distribution and all findings
- Detailed Findings All 6 findings by priority band
- Test Cases Control, target, DPP section, result
- Compliance Evidence Package Amazon DPP, SOC 2, ISO 27001:2022
- Programme Appendix Finding to DPP control mapping
- Appendix Team, distribution, glossary
- Disclaimer Limitations and sample notice
Executive Summary
Cybersecify performed an external network and email security assessment of Acme SaaS's staging perimeter in support of the Amazon SP-API Data Protection Policy submission. The assessment covered the externally reachable hosts, the TLS posture at the edge, and the email authentication and transport security configuration for the domain that carries Amazon related notifications.
The external service posture is tight. The reachable surface is limited to HTTPS on the expected hosts, TLS is current, and no unnecessary services were exposed. The findings concentrate in email security. The sending domain lacks a complete SPF policy and DKIM signing, and does not publish MTA-STS or TLS-RPT. Together these weaken the guarantees that a message claiming to come from Acme is genuine and that mail to Acme is delivered over enforced TLS. For a platform that sends and receives order and account notifications tied to Amazon buyers, these are the priority items for the submission.
Key Statistics
Business Impact Summary
The email authentication gaps are the material risk. Without an enforced SPF policy and DKIM signatures, a third party can send mail that appears to originate from the Acme domain, which supports phishing of buyers, sellers and staff using Acme's own brand. The absence of MTA-STS and TLS-RPT means inbound mail can be delivered over an unauthenticated or downgraded channel without any reporting signal. Each of these should be remediated and retested before the Letter of Attestation is issued.
Scope and Methodology
This was an external, unauthenticated network and email security assessment against the staging perimeter and the associated sending domain. No internal network access was in scope and no exploitation of third party mail infrastructure was performed.
In Scope Assets
| Area | Detail |
|---|---|
| External hosts | 203.0.113.11, 203.0.113.42 (staging ALB and edge) |
| Domains | *.staging.acmesaas.io and the acmesaas.io sending domain |
| TLS posture | Cipher suites, protocol versions and certificate configuration at the edge |
| Email security | SPF, DKIM, DMARC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT and related DNS records |
| DNS integrity | CAA, DNSSEC and record hygiene for the assessed zones |
Out of Scope
Internal network testing; denial of service and volumetric testing; exploitation or relay testing against third party mail providers; social engineering; physical security. Testing was non intrusive and limited to externally observable configuration. The AWS account and cluster configuration is assessed separately in the cloud report for the same engagement.
Methodology and Standards
| Standard | Application |
|---|---|
| CVSS v3.1 and v4.0 | Dual scoring on every finding with full vector strings. |
| CWE | Root cause classification on every finding. |
| RFC 7208 (SPF), RFC 6376 (DKIM), RFC 7489 (DMARC) | Email authentication baseline. |
| RFC 8461 (MTA-STS), RFC 8460 (TLS-RPT) | Inbound mail transport security baseline. |
| Amazon SP-API DPP | Every finding cited against the published Data Protection Policy: Section 1 General Security Requirements and Section 2 Additional Security Requirements Specific to PII. |
Tools
| Tool | Version | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| nmap | v7.98 | External service and port discovery against the in scope hosts. |
| testssl.sh | v3.2 | TLS protocol, cipher and certificate posture at the edge. |
| dig | v9.20 | Direct DNS record inspection for SPF, DKIM, DMARC, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, CAA and DNSSEC. |
| checkdmarc | v5.9 | Aggregated email authentication record validation. |
| MTA-STS policy fetch | manual | Retrieval and validation of the published transport security policy, where present. |
Testing Approach
External, unauthenticated inspection of the reachable service surface, the TLS configuration and the published DNS and email security records for the assessed domain. All checks were passive or single request and non intrusive. No mail was spoofed against live recipients and no third party infrastructure was tested.
Risk Rating Definitions
Severity is assigned from the CVSS v3.1 base score. Ratings describe the risk the condition presents in this environment, not a generic product rating.
| Rating | CVSS v3.1 | Definition |
|---|---|---|
| Critical | 9.0 to 10.0 | Direct, reliable compromise of Amazon information or of the platform holding it. Requires immediate containment ahead of any other remediation work. |
| High | 7.0 to 8.9 | A practical attack path to sensitive data or to administrative control, requiring no unusual preconditions. Remediate within one sprint. |
| Medium | 4.0 to 6.9 | A real weakness that needs a further condition, an existing foothold, or a chained finding to be exploited, or that materially weakens a control Amazon requires. Remediate within two sprints. |
| Low | 0.1 to 3.9 | Limited direct impact. Typically a defence in depth, logging, or hardening gap that raises cost and difficulty for an attacker once resolved. Address in the next hardening cycle. |
| Info | 0.0 | No vulnerability. An observation recorded because it affects the security posture or the evidence available to an assessor. |
Deliverables and Retest
This v1.0 report is the report of record for its scope. A full retest of every finding is carried out within 30 calendar days of delivery. The v2.0 retest report, showing each finding as closed, partially closed, or accepted as a documented risk, is issued within 3 business days of the retest completing. A Letter of Attestation, signed by the OSCP certified lead tester, follows the retest and confirms that an independent manual penetration test was performed to Amazon's requirements. The Letter is supporting evidence for the SP-API Data Protection Policy submission and is not a certification.
Policy Basis for the Mapping
Every DPP citation in this report refers to a numbered requirement in the Amazon Data Protection Policy as published: Section 1, General Security Requirements (1.1 Network Protection through 1.7 Request for Deletion or Return), and Section 2, Additional Security Requirements Specific to Personally Identifiable Information (2.1 Data Retention through 2.7 Vulnerability Management). No control domain is inferred or renumbered. Where a condition has no corresponding requirement in the published policy, the mapping says so rather than assigning one.
Amazon Required Report Elements
This report is structured to cover the six elements Amazon expects of a penetration test report submitted in support of SP-API DPP approval. Amazon reviews and decides on the submission; this report is independent, third party evidence and not an approval.
| # | Required Element | Where It Is Covered |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Executive summary with overall risk rating and severity breakdown | Section 1 |
| 2 | Testing methodology and scope coverage | Section 2 |
| 3 | Findings classified by severity using CVSS v3.1 and v4.0 | Sections 3 and 4 |
| 4 | Tool output and manual verification evidence | Section 4, Evidence on every finding |
| 5 | Remediation guidance with status tracking | Sections 3 and 4 |
| 6 | Compliance mapping to the applicable control domains | Section 6 |
Findings Summary
The assessment produced 6 findings: 3 Medium and 3 Informational. No Critical or High severity findings were identified. The three email security findings are grouped as P1 for the submission; the informational edge and DNS observations are P3.
Findings Identified by Severity
Severity Distribution
| Severity | Count | CVSS Range | Remediation Priority |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | 9.0 to 10.0 | Immediate (P0) |
| High | 0 | 7.0 to 8.9 | Within 1 sprint |
| Medium | 3 | 4.0 to 6.9 | Within 2 sprints |
| Low | 0 | 0.1 to 3.9 | Next hardening cycle |
| Info | 3 | 0.0 | Best practice recommendation |
All Findings
| DPP Priority | Finding ID | Title | Test Case | Severity | CVSS v3.1 | CVSS v4.0 | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| P1 | CS-2026-S01 | SPF Record Missing Primary and Transactional Providers | TC-01 | Medium | 6.5 | 7.1 | Open |
| P1 | CS-2026-S02 | DKIM Not Configured for Primary Mail Provider | TC-02 | Medium | 6.5 | 7.1 | Open |
| P1 | CS-2026-S03 | SMTP Transport Security Not Enforced: MTA-STS and TLS-RPT Absent | TC-03 | Medium | 4.2 | 2.3 | Open |
| P3 | CS-2026-S04 | Staging ALB Directly Internet Accessible (No CDN Proxy) | TC-04 | Info | 0.0 | 0.0 | Open |
| P3 | CS-2026-S05 | security.txt Absent: No Responsible Disclosure Contact Published | TC-05 | Info | 0.0 | 0.0 | Open |
| P3 | CS-2026-S06 | DNS Issuance and Integrity Hardening Absent | TC-06 | Info | 0.0 | 0.0 | Open |
This is a redacted sample. The table above lists the full finding set by title; Section 4 gives complete write ups for a representative finding in each priority band present in this report (P1 and P3) and across the severity range, so the reader can see the exact format, evidence, and Amazon DPP mapping without reproducing every finding. A real engagement report details every finding in full.
Priority Definitions
Findings are grouped by remediation priority for the Amazon SP-API Data Protection Policy submission. P1 findings block the submission and must be remediated and retested before the Letter of Attestation is issued. P2 findings are DPP relevant but not submission blocking; they strengthen the attestation and should be remediated on the stated timeline. P3 findings are lower priority hardening items that improve the overall security posture and are addressed in the normal hardening cycle.
Detailed Findings
All 6 findings are listed below in the same structure. The source report publishes complete write ups for one finding in each priority band present, CS-2026-S01 for P1 and CS-2026-S05 for P3, and publishes the summary attributes for the remaining four. Those four are reproduced here exactly as the source states them, with no description, vector string or CWE added.
P1 · DPP Submission Blockers
SPF Record Missing Primary and Transactional Providers
Description
The domain's SPF record does not authorise the primary mailbox provider or the transactional email provider that the platform uses to send order and account notifications, and it terminates in a soft fail rather than a hard fail. A receiving server therefore has no reliable basis to reject mail that forges the Acme domain in the envelope sender.
Steps to Reproduce
- Query the domain's TXT records and locate the SPF record.
- Enumerate the sending sources the platform actually uses (mailbox provider, transactional provider).
- Confirm those sending sources are not represented in the SPF record.
- Confirm the record ends in a soft fail qualifier rather than a hard fail.
Evidence
dig +short TXT acmesaas.io "v=spf1 include:_spf.<partial> ~all" (primary and transactional providers absent; ~all soft fail)
Business Impact
Without a complete, enforcing SPF policy, a third party can send mail that passes basic origin checks while forging the Acme domain, enabling brand impersonation and phishing against buyers, sellers and staff. This directly weakens the trust in notifications tied to Amazon orders.
Why Amazon Cares
Amazon related notifications flow through this domain, and those notifications carry Information. DPP 1.1 requires network protection controls that deny access to unauthorised sources; an SPF record is the DNS expression of that control for mail, and one that omits the real senders and soft fails cannot deny anything. A forgeable sending domain also undermines the accuracy of the processing record required by DPP 2.2, because the set of parties that can send as Acme is not the set recorded.
Remediation
Publish a complete SPF record that authorises every legitimate sending source, including the transactional provider, and terminate the policy in a hard fail once the sending inventory is confirmed. Pair this with an enforcing DMARC policy so that a failure produces a reject rather than a report.
Compliance Mapping
| Framework | Control / Relevance |
|---|---|
| SOC 2 (TSC) | CC6.7 protect information in transmission, CC7.1 configuration |
| ISO 27001:2022 | A.5.14 Information transfer, A.8.9 Configuration management |
| MITRE ATT&CK | T1656 Impersonation; T1566 Phishing |
| Amazon DPP | DPP 1.1 Network Protection, DPP 2.2 Data Governance |
DKIM Not Configured for Primary Mail Provider
DPP Impact
No signature allows a receiver to verify a message came from Acme.
Compliance Mapping
| Framework | Control / Relevance |
|---|---|
| SOC 2 (TSC) | CC6.7 Protect information in transmission, CC7.1 Configuration and record hygiene |
| ISO 27001:2022 | A.5.14 Information transfer, A.8.9 Configuration management |
| Amazon DPP | DPP 1.1 Network Protection, DPP 2.2 Data Governance |
The source sample does not publish a description, vector strings, CWE, evidence or remediation text for this finding. Nothing has been supplied in their place.
SMTP Transport Security Not Enforced: MTA-STS and TLS-RPT Absent
DPP Impact
Inbound mail is not guaranteed an encrypted transport and failures go unreported.
Compliance Mapping
| Framework | Control / Relevance |
|---|---|
| SOC 2 (TSC) | CC6.7 Protect information in transmission, CC7.1 Configuration and record hygiene |
| ISO 27001:2022 | A.5.14 Information transfer, A.8.9 Configuration management |
| Amazon DPP | DPP 1.5 Encryption in Transit |
The source sample does not publish a description, vector strings, CWE, evidence or remediation text for this finding. Nothing has been supplied in their place.
P3 · Lower Priority Hardening Findings
Staging ALB Directly Internet Accessible (No CDN Proxy)
DPP Impact
Origin reachable directly, so edge filtering can be bypassed.
Compliance Mapping
| Framework | Control / Relevance |
|---|---|
| SOC 2 (TSC) | CC6.6 Boundary protection |
| ISO 27001:2022 | A.8.20 Networks security |
| Amazon DPP | DPP 1.1 Network Protection |
The source sample does not publish a description, vector strings, CWE, evidence or remediation text for this finding. Nothing has been supplied in their place.
security.txt Absent: No Responsible Disclosure Contact Published
Description
No security.txt file is published at the well known path, so a researcher or a downstream partner who identifies an issue has no defined channel to report it. This is a best practice observation with no direct exploitability.
Steps to Reproduce
- Request the well known security.txt path on the primary web host.
- Observe that the path returns 404 with no disclosure contact defined.
Evidence
curl -sS https://acmesaas.io/.well-known/security.txt HTTP 404 (no disclosure contact)
Business Impact
The absence of a disclosure channel slows the reporting and triage of externally discovered issues. It carries no direct security impact and is recorded as a hardening and governance recommendation only.
Remediation
Publish a security.txt file at the well known path with a monitored contact address and, optionally, a policy link and an expiry date, following RFC 9116. Route the address to the same queue that handles the incident response plan, so an external report reaches the people who can act on it.
Compliance Mapping
| Framework | Control / Relevance |
|---|---|
| SOC 2 (TSC) | CC2.3 external communication of security matters |
| ISO 27001:2022 | A.5.5 Contact with authorities, A.5.6 Contact with special interest groups |
| MITRE ATT&CK | N/A (governance) |
| Amazon DPP | No corresponding requirement in the published policy (governance best practice) |
DNS Issuance and Integrity Hardening Absent
DPP Impact
Certificate issuance and DNS responses are not constrained or authenticated.
Compliance Mapping
| Framework | Control / Relevance |
|---|---|
| SOC 2 (TSC) | CC6.6 Boundary protection, CC7.1 Configuration and record hygiene |
| ISO 27001:2022 | A.8.9 Configuration management, A.8.20 Networks security |
| Amazon DPP | DPP 1.1 Network Protection |
The source sample does not publish a description, vector strings, CWE, evidence or remediation text for this finding. Nothing has been supplied in their place.
Test Cases
Each test case maps to the assessed control and the finding that resulted. Every case below returned a FAIL and corresponds to a confirmed finding; controls confirmed working are recorded in the Compliance Evidence Package.
| TC # | Test Case | Target | DPP Section | Result | Finding |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TC-01 | Validate an enforcing SPF policy covering all legitimate senders | acmesaas.io | 1.1 | FAIL | CS-2026-S01 |
| TC-02 | Validate DKIM signing on the primary mail provider | acmesaas.io | 1.1 | FAIL | CS-2026-S02 |
| TC-03 | Validate MTA-STS and TLS-RPT for inbound mail transport | acmesaas.io | 1.5 | FAIL | CS-2026-S03 |
| TC-04 | Assess direct exposure of the staging ALB at the edge | edge hosts | 1.1 | FAIL | CS-2026-S04 |
| TC-05 | Check for a published responsible disclosure contact | web edge | None | FAIL | CS-2026-S05 |
| TC-06 | Assess DNS issuance and integrity hardening (CAA, DNSSEC) | DNS zone | 1.1 | FAIL | CS-2026-S06 |
Compliance Evidence Package
This section maps findings and positive controls to the published Amazon Data Protection Policy, the SOC 2 Trust Services Criteria, and ISO 27001:2022 Annex A. Every DPP citation refers to a numbered requirement in the policy as published by Amazon. The coverage below is limited to the requirements an external network and email assessment can speak to; the remaining requirements are addressed in the cloud report for the same engagement. This assessment is independent evaluation evidence. Cybersecify is not a CPA firm and does not perform the SOC 2 examination, is not ISO 27001 or SOC 2 certified, and does not approve the DPP submission.
A. Positive Controls Confirmed
| Area | Evidence |
|---|---|
| External Service Posture | Reachable surface limited to HTTPS on the expected hosts; no unnecessary services exposed on the assessed IPs. |
| Encryption in Transit | TLS 1.3 and 1.2 only at the edge; legacy protocols and weak cipher suites disabled. |
| Certificate Hygiene | Certificate matches the served hosts, with a current validity window and a trusted issuer. |
| DMARC Presence | A DMARC record is published, providing a reporting and policy anchor to build enforcement on. |
B. Amazon DPP Section Coverage
| DPP Section | Requirement | Status | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1.1 | Network Protection | Partial | The reachable service surface is correctly restricted, but unauthorised mail senders are not denied and DNS issuance is unconstrained (S01, S02, S04, S06). |
| 1.5 | Encryption in Transit | Partial | Web transport enforces TLS 1.2 or better; inbound mail transport has no enforcement or reporting policy (S03). |
| 2.2 | Data Governance | Partial | The set of parties able to send as the domain is wider than the processing record describes (S01, S02). |
| 2.7 | Vulnerability Management | Met | This assessment provides the external test evidence for the 180 day requirement. |
C. SOC 2 Trust Services Criteria Coverage
| Criterion | Description | Findings |
|---|---|---|
| CC6.6 | Boundary protection | S04, S06 |
| CC6.7 | Protect information in transmission | S01, S02, S03 |
| CC7.1 | Configuration and record hygiene | S01, S02, S03, S06 |
| CC2.3 | External communication of security matters | S05 |
D. ISO 27001:2022 Annex A Coverage
| Control | Description | Findings |
|---|---|---|
| A.5.14 | Information transfer | S01, S02, S03 |
| A.8.9 | Configuration management | S01, S02, S03, S06 |
| A.8.20 | Networks security | S04, S06 |
| A.5.5 / A.5.6 | Contact with authorities and interest groups | S05 |
Programme Appendix
Finding to DPP control mapping and priority band coverage for the SP-API Data Protection Policy submission programme.
| Finding | Severity | DPP Section | DPP Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| CS-2026-S01 | Medium | 1.1 / 2.2 | Sending domain can be forged, so unauthorised senders are not denied |
| CS-2026-S02 | Medium | 1.1 / 2.2 | No signature allows a receiver to verify a message came from Acme |
| CS-2026-S03 | Medium | 1.5 | Inbound mail is not guaranteed an encrypted transport and failures go unreported |
| CS-2026-S04 | Info | 1.1 | Origin reachable directly, so edge filtering can be bypassed |
| CS-2026-S05 | Info | None | No published disclosure contact; no corresponding DPP requirement |
| CS-2026-S06 | Info | 1.1 | Certificate issuance and DNS responses are not constrained or authenticated |
Appendix
A. Testing Team and Authorisation
| Assessor | Role | Credentials |
|---|---|---|
| Rathnakara GN | Lead Assessor | OSCP (OS-101-34173) |
B. Report Distribution
| Recipient | Organisation | Copy |
|---|---|---|
| Daniel Reyes | Acme SaaS Pvt. Ltd. | Electronic |
| Priya Nair | Acme SaaS Pvt. Ltd. | Electronic |
| Rathnakara GN | Cyber Secify Consulting (OPC) Private Limited | Electronic |
| Ashok Kamat | Cyber Secify Consulting (OPC) Private Limited | Electronic |
C. Glossary
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| CAA | Certification Authority Authorisation. A DNS record naming the certificate authorities permitted to issue for a domain. |
| CVSS | Common Vulnerability Scoring System. A 0 to 10 severity score with a vector string; this report uses v3.1 and v4.0. |
| DKIM | DomainKeys Identified Mail. A cryptographic signature that lets a receiver verify a message was not altered and came from the domain. |
| DMARC | Domain based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance. A policy layered on SPF and DKIM. |
| DNSSEC | DNS Security Extensions. Signs DNS responses so a resolver can detect tampering. |
| MTA-STS | Mail Transfer Agent Strict Transport Security. Enforces TLS on inbound mail delivery. |
| SPF | Sender Policy Framework. A DNS record listing the servers authorised to send mail for a domain. |
| TLS-RPT | TLS Reporting. Delivers reports on inbound mail transport security failures. |
Disclaimer
Limitations of Testing
Penetration testing is inherently limited by the scope, time, and resources allocated to the engagement. No individual or organisation can guarantee identifying all security issues. The testing performed is conducted on a best effort basis, and the findings reported herein are specific to the environment provided for testing.
Scope of Findings
The reported findings apply exclusively to the tested environment and configurations during testing. Information systems rely on human factors and can be inherently vulnerable to human error. While Cybersecify has endeavoured to identify significant security vulnerabilities in the analysed systems, it is impossible to assure that all potential vulnerabilities have been discovered. This document does not constitute legal advice.
Continued Vigilance
Security is an ongoing process. Regular assessments and updates to security measures are essential to maintaining a strong security posture. Cybersecify recommends periodic penetration testing and continuous monitoring to adapt to new threats and vulnerabilities.
Sample Notice
This is a redacted sample report for a fictional company, Acme SaaS Pvt. Ltd., produced to demonstrate the structure, finding format, and compliance mapping of a Cybersecify Amazon SP-API Data Protection Policy engagement. The company, domains, addresses, identifiers, and findings are illustrative and do not describe any real client or assessment.
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