Platform Programmes

Amazon SP-API Pentest: What the DPP Requires

Amazon SP-API Data Protection Policy requires an annual pentest, but only for PII roles. Exact scope, evidence, cadence and who is allowed to test.

AK
Cybersecify

Amazon’s Selling Partner API Data Protection Policy requires a penetration test at least every 365 days, but only for Solution Providers handling personally identifiable information. The clause sits in section 2.7, under Additional Security Requirements Specific to Personally Identifiable Information. Section 1, which binds every Solution Provider, has no penetration testing requirement at all. Clause 2.7.2 enumerates four scope categories: network infrastructure, cloud environments, application-layer assets, and other in-scope systems. The pentest is one of four technical legs in 2.7, alongside 30 day vulnerability scanning, change-triggered scanning and code scanning before every release. Amazon does not ask you to submit the report; section 3 makes it a record you keep.

Cybersecify is a founder-led penetration testing company, and the clause 2.7.2 penetration test described on this page is one of the engagements we deliver for Amazon SP-API Solution Providers holding restricted roles. Our SP-API DPP service page carries the scope mapping, the price and the deliverables; this page is about what Amazon actually requires, which is a different question and comes first.

Everything below is quoted from Amazon’s own policy and developer documentation, and linked. We wrote it because the small amount of published material on SP-API compliance repeats two claims Amazon’s documents do not support: that every integrator needs a pentest, and that it must be done by an external third party. Neither is true as stated.

If you already know the clause binds you and you are now choosing a tester, the companion piece covers what a qualifying test looks like and how to evaluate a vendor: SP-API DPP pentest, why scanner output fails.

Key findings

  • The word “penetration” appears five times in the Data Protection Policy, all inside clause 2.7: the 2.7.2 heading, three sentences within it, and once in 2.7.3. Everything Amazon requires of a penetration test sits in that one clause.
  • Clause 2.7 is four numbered subsections: 2.7.1 Vulnerability Scanning, 2.7.2 Penetration Testing, 2.7.3 Vulnerability Remediation, 2.7.4 Disaster Recovery and Business Continuity. 2.7.2 requires an “industry-recognized methodology”, enumerates four scope categories, and sets the cadence at least every 365 days, which in practice means once every year. Amazon restructured this on 25 November 2025, so a copy saved before then reads differently and is worth re-reading.
  • Section 2.7 requires four separate technical activities, not one: vulnerability scanning at least every 30 days, change-triggered scanning after significant network, application or infrastructure changes, penetration tests at least every 365 days, and code scanning prior to each software release. The change-triggered leg has no calendar attached, which is why a scanning contract on a fixed cadence does not close 2.7.1 by itself.
  • The requirement is PII-scoped. Section 2 opens by stating those requirements apply to PII, granted on a must-have basis for select tax and merchant fulfilled shipping purposes. Section 1, the general requirements, has no pentest clause.
  • đź”´ The word “independent” appears ONCE in the Data Protection Policy, in section 3, where it describes Amazon’s own right to audit YOU through an independent certified public accounting firm. It does not appear in clause 2.7.2 and it does not describe your penetration tester. Verified 17 October 2026 in both the en_US and en_CA copies. Two words in the clause itself pull the other way and neither requires an outside tester: 2.7.2 says testing must assess vulnerabilities across “external-facing components”, which describes what to test, not who tests; and the separate guidance says “qualified security professionals or third-party firms”, where the or permits a qualified in-house team. That is why this clause is so widely misreported as requiring an independent test.
  • Clause 2.7.2 is silent on who may test. The policy text names no tester requirement at all; only Amazon’s separate guidance mentions “qualified security professionals or third-party firms”, and guidance is not the binding document. Silence in the binding document leaves the question to whoever reviews your submission, and a reviewer who asks for independent testing contradicts nothing Amazon has published. Plan for independent. Detail below.
  • The in-house permission carries a condition. Its security controls guidance says to perform annual penetration testing “using qualified security professionals or third-party firms”. The equivalent PCI wording, which is the standard most teams reach for next, permits internal testers only “as long as they are organizationally independent”. A team testing the product it built usually is not. What you actually give up by keeping it in-house is set out below, so you can price the choice rather than assume it.
  • Remediation clocks are tight, and they are not pentest-only: clause 2.7.3 gives critical vulnerabilities 7 days from discovery and high-risk vulnerabilities 30 days, applied to findings from vulnerability scanning, penetration testing and code scanning alike.
  • There is a SECOND clock, and it is not in this clause. The windows above are yours, running on findings you discover yourself. Separately, Amazon assesses Solution Providers directly, publishes findings to a portal it runs, and sets its own deadlines with its own enforcement. Those deadlines are shorter than people expect, counted in calendar days, and not published in Amazon’s developer documentation. If Amazon has sent you a Data Security Assessment, the Plan of Action window and the remediation clock are set out here.
  • A second test is expected after remediation. Amazon’s vulnerability management guide states that after the remediation stage, Solution Providers must run a second penetration test to validate that all identified vulnerabilities have been completely remediated.

Does this clause apply to you at all?

Solution Providers building on the Selling Partner API who hold restricted roles are the group section 2.7 binds. In our experience that skews toward AI-first and API-first SaaS startups building shipping, tax, invoicing or fulfilment tooling for Amazon sellers, where PII access is unavoidable because the product needs an address or a tax identity to work. If you are building pricing, listing or analytics tooling and hold no restricted roles, read the policy again before you assume the clause applies to you.

What does clause 2.7.2 actually require?

Section 2.7 is a preamble followed by four numbered subsections. Most write-ups paraphrase it into something stricter than it is, so here is what each part actually requires, checked against the live policy on 17 September 2026.

The preamble: “Solution Provider must create and maintain a documented vulnerability management plan and/or runbook to detect and remediate vulnerabilities.”

2.7.1 Vulnerability Scanning sets three minimum requirements, not one: scanning “at least every 30 days”, change-triggered scanning “following significant network, application or infrastructure changes”, and code scanning “completed prior to each software release”. The change-triggered leg is the one most summaries drop, including an earlier version of this page. It has no calendar, so a quarterly scanning contract does not satisfy it on its own.

2.7.2 Penetration Testing requires testing “at least every 365 days using an industry-recognized methodology”, covering systems that process, store or transmit Amazon data across four scope categories: network infrastructure “including public-facing and internal network boundaries, firewalls, routers, and switches”; cloud environments “including cloud platforms and associated services and configurations”; application-layer assets “including web applications, APIs, databases and storage systems (file/object)”; and other in-scope systems “as applicable (e.g., desktop applications or mobile applications)”. The clause adds that testing must assess vulnerabilities “across external-facing components, application functionality, access controls, system configurations, and interfaces”.

2.7.3 Vulnerability Remediation sets “Critical vulnerabilities: 7 days from discovery” and “High-risk vulnerabilities: 30 days from discovery”. Read this one twice: the clocks attach to findings from vulnerability scanning, penetration testing and code scanning, so a scanner finding starts the same 7 day clock a pentest finding does.

2.7.4 Disaster Recovery and Business Continuity requires documented procedures to restore availability and access to PII after a physical or technical incident, and “a geographically separated secondary/backup site to ensure timely restoration (RTO/RPO) of PII access and availability”.

One note on sourcing. The live DPP page carries no version number and no effective date on the policy page itself. The date does exist, just not where you would look for it. The current revision is effective 25 August 2026, and the section below sets out what that one changed. The revision before it took effect 25 November 2025, and Amazon’s SP-API changelog lists what that one changed: Developer became Solution Provider, account lockout after 10 failed logins, 10-password history, regular API key rotation, TLS 1.2+ with KMS, a named Incident Management Point of Contact, non-PII retention capped at 18 months, log retention raised to 12 months, critical remediation in 7 days and high in 30, geographically dispersed backups, audit cooperation extended to Amazon’s affiliates and contractors, and mandatory third-party risk assessments for vendors and subcontractors. Save a dated copy of the policy anyway, because the policy page still will not tell you which revision you are reading. We searched the full fetched document for one. If you are building a compliance file, save a dated copy of the policy text you relied on, because you cannot cite a version.

What does satisfying it look like in practice?

That is the obligation. The fair next question is what the evidence looks like, and you should not have to buy an engagement to find out.

Request the SP-API DPP evidence checklist. The eight areas of evidence Amazon asks a solution provider to produce under the Data Protection Policy and its Solution Provider Security Assessment, who produces each item, and which ones a penetration test evidences for you. Sent on request, read by a founder first.

Request the sanitised SP-API DPP sample reports. Sanitised reports in the form a clause 2.7.2 submission takes, one per scope category Amazon enumerates, with the client fictional and findings mapped to the numbered Data Protection Policy sections. Each page sets out what its report evidences; the full documents are sent on request and read by a founder before they go out. If you want a full report with nothing in the way, the penetration test report example is published in its entirety, no request, and covers a web and API engagement.

The rest of this page is the detail that decides whether 2.7 binds you at all, what falls in scope, and who is allowed to do the testing.

What has to be in scope, and what does not?

The policy’s applicability statement is the outer boundary:

“This policy is applicable to all systems that store, process, or otherwise handle data vended and retrieved from the Amazon Services API.”

In practice, for a typical SP-API integrator, that reads as:

SurfaceWhy it is in scope
The integrating web applicationAuthentication, session handling, authorisation between seller accounts, and anywhere Amazon data surfaces to a user
Your API and backendThe code that calls SP-API, handles tokens, and moves Amazon data between services
Datastores holding Amazon dataSection 2 states that if PII is combined with non-PII, the entire data store must comply
Hosting environmentAmazon’s guidance directs you to test both external-facing infrastructure and internal systems
Connected environmentsAnything that stores, processes or handles data retrieved from the API

Each of those surfaces has a sample report, sanitised, with the client fictional. Each page below sets out what that report evidences and which DPP scope category it covers; the full document is sent on request, and the generic sample report is published in full with no request if you want the format first:

Surface aboveThe report for it
The integrating web application, your API and backendWeb and API pentest report
Hosting environment, external and internal infrastructureNetwork pentest report
Cloud configuration where you are hosted on AWSCloud pentest report

Amazon publishes no per-surface checklist and mandates no methodology, so the scope is yours to define and to defend if audited. Two practical notes from Amazon’s own pages. It tells you to review its AWS penetration testing guidance before testing AWS services, which matters if you are hosted there. And its security controls guidance explicitly names internal systems alongside external-facing infrastructure, so an external-only scope is a narrower reading than Amazon’s wording invites.

One thing to keep out of your scope document. Claims that Amazon specifically expects OAuth 2.0 or Login with Amazon token lifecycle coverage, or a particular grey-box framing, come from vendor marketing rather than Amazon documentation. Token handling is worth testing on its merits, and our API security testing guide covers it against the OWASP API Security Top 10 2023. Just do not write it into a compliance document as an Amazon requirement.

If you are unsure whether your engagement should be an API test, a web application test, or both, API pentest vs web app pentest walks through the difference.

Why your scope is wider than clause 2.7.2 suggests

Section 2.7 does not sit in the general requirements. It sits inside section 2, which opens:

“The following additional Security Requirements must be met for Personally Identifiable Information (“PII”). PII is granted to Solution Provider for select tax and merchant fulfilled shipping purposes, on a must-have basis. If an Amazon Services API contains PII, or PII is combined with non-PII, then the entire data store must comply with the following requirements.”

Section 1, General Security Requirements, runs from 1.1 Network Protection through 1.8 Data Attribution and covers firewalls, access management, least privilege, credential management, encryption in transit, risk management and incident response, deletion and data attribution. There is no penetration testing clause in it.

Practically, the pentest obligation follows the restricted roles. Amazon’s roles documentation marks five roles as restricted, meaning they require sensitive information which might include PII (corrected 2026-10-17: this page previously said four and omitted Selling Partner Support):

Restricted roleWhat it is used for
Direct-to-Consumer Shipping (Restricted)Shipping orders directly to customers; order reports, order tracking reports, EasyShip
Professional Services (Restricted)Add-on services such as assembly and installation, via the Services API
Selling Partner Support (Restricted)Seller support cases and related correspondence
Tax Invoicing (Restricted)Generating tax invoices to comply with tax regulation
Tax Remittance (Restricted)Calculating and remitting sales taxes

Non-restricted roles include Pricing, Product Listing, Inventory and Order Tracking, Finance and Accounting, Brand Analytics, Buyer Communication, Amazon Fulfillment and others. Amazon’s own description of Inventory and Order Tracking is explicit that operations requiring it do not use the PII required to ship an order.

Check your roles before you buy anything. If you hold no restricted roles, section 2 is not the section that binds you. A pentest may still be a good idea, and an enterprise seller or an investor may ask for one, but that is a different reason with a different scope conversation.

Can you run the test yourselves, or must it be independent?

đź”´ The policy does not answer this. It is silent, and silence is not permission. Clause 2.7.2 reads, in full:

“The Solution Provider must perform penetration testing at least every 365 days using an industry-recognized methodology.”

That is the whole clause. It says nothing about who performs the test. Not independent, not third-party, not external, not internal, and no tester qualification. Verified against the policy text on 30 September 2026.

The only place Amazon writes anything about the tester is its security controls guidance, which is a separate document with less force than the policy:

“Perform annual penetration testing using qualified security professionals or third-party firms and scan application code prior to each software release.”

Qualified security professionals or third-party firms. That sentence does permit qualified in-house testing, and Amazon names no accreditation body, no approved vendor panel and no required certification anywhere in the DPP, the vulnerability management guide or the security controls guidance.

đź”´ But read the two together and the practical consequence is the opposite of reassuring. The binding text is silent; the permissive wording sits in guidance. Silence in the binding document leaves the question to whoever reviews your submission, which is exactly the space in which a reviewer can ask for independent testing without contradicting anything Amazon has published.

The only independence language in the policy is in section 3, and it points the other way. It concerns Amazon’s right to audit you, either itself or through “an independent certified public accounting firm selected by Amazon”. That is Amazon’s auditor, not yours.

This is not unusual, and it is worth knowing the pattern. The PCI Security Standards Council takes the same position in its own Penetration Testing Guidance information supplement (version 1.1, September 2017), which states that “qualified internal resources or a qualified third party may perform the penetration test as long as they are organizationally independent”, and lists tester certifications as an indication of skill while noting they are not required certifications. Programmes that genuinely lock testing to an accredited panel say so in plain language. When the wording is open, it is open.

What that means for planning

🔴 Corrected 30 September 2026. This section previously ended: “If a vendor tells you Amazon requires an external third party, ask them to point at the line. There isn’t one.” The statement about the policy text was true. As advice it was wrong, and wrong in the direction that costs you a cycle, so it has been replaced.

The reason is in the structure of the two documents above. The binding clause is silent on the tester. The only permissive wording sits in guidance. A silent requirement is not a settled one: it leaves the question to whoever reviews your submission, and a reviewer who asks for independent testing contradicts nothing Amazon has published.

The cost of guessing wrong is not symmetric, which is what should drive the decision:

ChoiceIf you are not askedIf you are asked
Budget for independent testingYou paid the difference between two ways of buying the same workNothing changes
Test in-houseYou saved the differenceYou pay for a second test, and the integration stays blocked while 2.7.3’s clocks keep running

Three things you give up by keeping it in-house, so you can price the choice rather than assume it. The Letter of Engagement, the document you hand Amazon, is issued by the firm running the test; an internal team cannot issue itself one. Organisational independence is the condition the PCI Security Standards Council attaches to the same permission, and a team testing the product it built usually does not meet it. And if Amazon comes back, a firm re-tests and re-issues under the original engagement while an internal team absorbs the delay.

None of that makes an in-house test non-compliant. It makes it a trade to take deliberately, with the asymmetry above in view.

What evidence does Amazon ask you to hold?

There is no routine report submission. What section 3 requires is:

  • Records. All appropriate books and records reasonably required to verify compliance with the Acceptable Use Policy, the DPP and the Developer Agreement, kept during the agreement and for 12 months after.
  • Written certification on request. Upon Amazon’s written request, you must certify in writing that you are in compliance with these policies.
  • Cooperation with audit. Amazon may, on reasonable request, audit, assess and inspect the books, records, facilities, operations and security of all systems involved in retrieving, storing or processing Amazon data, either itself or through an independent certified public accounting firm it selects. The audit may occur at your facilities or a subcontractor’s.
  • Remediation at your cost. If deficiencies are found you must remediate at your sole cost within an agreed timeframe, provide remediation evidence in the form Amazon requests, and obtain written approval before closure.

Separately, registering as a public developer for restricted roles puts you through a two phase review: Phase 1 business verification and developer profile assessment, Phase 2 a data security assessment covering data flow architecture, PII protection controls, storage and handling procedures, security protocols, and incident response and breach procedures. Amazon also says restricted role applicants should prepare for an architecture review with the SP-API Solutions Architecture team, which can involve a screen sharing demo. Amazon’s documentation does not name a penetration test report as a required artefact of that review.

What this means for your report. Nobody at Amazon is grading the formatting, but you need a document that survives being handed to an auditor a year later: dated, scoped explicitly, findings with reproduction steps, severity aligned to the 7 day and 30 day remediation clocks, and retest evidence attached. Our sample report shows the structure we ship, and how to read a VAPT report covers what to look for in anyone’s.

How often do you have to retest?

Amazon’s vulnerability management guide sets out penetration testing in five stages: planning, scan and discovery, penetration, analysis and report, and remediation and clean up. Then it adds the line that turns it into a cycle:

“After the remediation stage, solutions providers must run a second pen test to validate that all identified vulnerabilities have been completely remediated.”

Combined with section 2.7’s remediation clocks, the calendar looks like this:

StepTiming driver
Penetration testAt least every 365 days
Remediate critical risk findingsWithin 7 days of discovery
Remediate high-risk findingsWithin 30 days of discovery
Second test to validate remediationAfter remediation
Vulnerability scanningEvery 30 days, continuously
Code vulnerability scanningBefore every release

Planning consequence: do not book the test for the week before a major release. The 7 day critical window and the retest both have to land somewhere, and a release in the middle of that changes what the retest is even testing.

If this is a renewal, what changed under you?

🔴 This section moved to its own page on 2026-10-17, because a renewal is a different question from “does the clause apply to me” and it was buried as heading seven of thirteen here. The renewal answer now lives at Annual SP-API DPP reassessment: do you need a new pentest? It carries the 365-day arithmetic, the full table of what the 25 November 2025 revision added, what the 25 August 2026 revision added, and the part renewal buyers get caught by: roughly half the list is not findable by a penetration test at all.

The short answer, so this page is not a dead end: the test is due at least every 365 days, the clock runs on the test rather than on the submission, and if your last one predates 25 November 2025 you are renewing against a policy that has changed materially twice since.

There is a second revision, effective 25 August 2026, and it expands the testing clause again

đź”´ If you read the section above and stopped, you are one revision behind. Amazon published a further policy update that took effect on 25 August 2026. We did not carry it until 15 October 2026, and the reason is worth stating because it will catch other people the same way: the policy page itself never tells you that it changed.

The live policy carries no version number and no effective date. So the only way to know which revision you are reading is to compare its text against the changelog entries, and the only way to know a revision happened is to be watching a surface that announces it. Amazon’s SP-API changelog does carry this one, under “Solution Provider Portal Agreement and Policy Updates”, alongside a separate announcement page. We were watching for a changelog entry whose title named the Data Protection Policy, as the November 2025 one did, and this entry’s title names the Portal Agreement instead. A title-based watch on a changelog is not a substitute for diffing the policy text, which is the practical lesson and the reason we now re-read the full policy rather than the announcements.

How to tell which revision you are holding, since Amazon will not tell you. The 25 November 2025 text introduced an 18 month cap on non-PII retention and a definition of “Amazon Partners”. If the copy in front of you contains neither of those, but does require a web application firewall, a 15 minute screen lock and a 10 attempt account lockout, you are reading the 25 August 2026 revision or later. That test is ours, not Amazon’s, and it is the only version check available.

What Amazon says changed, quoted from its own announcement:

“Effective August 25, 2026, we’re updating the agreement and policies that govern how you use the Solution Provider Portal to strengthen security standards. These changes apply to all solution providers. Most formalize existing security expectations, but some may require updates to your current security controls.”

The Data Protection Policy now additionally requires, in Amazon’s words, “a web application firewall for internet-facing endpoints, storage encryption on all devices, a 15-minute screen lock, and a 30-minute lockout after ten failed login attempts”. 🔴 One correction to that list, because the announcement and the policy do not match. The policy text sets no lockout duration: clause 1.2.2 requires only “account lockout controls after no more than ten (10) consecutive unsuccessful login attempts”. The thirty minute figure appears in Amazon’s announcement and in no version of the policy we have compared. Scope against the clause, not the announcement. You must also “designate an Incident Management Point of Contact, encrypt all credentials at rest, delete information within 30 days when required, and meet expanded vulnerability scanning and penetration testing requirements, including for Application Programming Interfaces”.

The Acceptable Use Policy “now includes a quality and performance standard for submissions made on behalf of Authorized Users and expands the throttling-circumvention prohibition”. The Solution Provider Portal Agreement clarifies “when you must maintain insurance coverage”.

The clause that matters for this page is the last one in that first list. Clause 2.7.2 already named “application-layer assets”; the live policy text now enumerates “web applications, APIs, databases and storage systems” inside that category. If your last pentest scoped the web application and treated the API as out of scope or as an afterthought, that is the gap this revision closes, and it closes it against you rather than for you.

🔴 Two honest limits on this section. First, Amazon’s announcement is a summary and the policy is what binds: read the live clause, not this paragraph, before you scope anything. Second, “continued use of the Selling Partner API (SP-API) after August 25 means you accept the updated agreement and policies”, in Amazon’s words, so there is no opt-in step to look for in your portal.

Source: Amazon, “Announcement for Policy Update”, developer.amazonservices.com/policy-update-for-sp-api, read in full on 15 October 2026. Clause text cross-checked the same day against the live Data Protection Policy at sellercentral.amazon.com/solution-provider/policy?policyType=DPP&locale=en_US.

Can Amazon’s free tools cover any of this?

Worth knowing before you spend anything. Amazon describes SP-API Guard as:

“a serverless application that scans Amazon Web Services (AWS) accounts to assess security compliance with Amazon’s Data Protection Policy. It leverages custom scan rules built with AWS Security services to look for security gaps, and then returns a findings report with clear remediation recommendations after 24 hours.”

It is free and it takes very little to set up. Run it first. It covers configuration assessment of your AWS account against DPP requirements, which is real work you would otherwise pay someone to do.

Guard looks inward, at the AWS account. For the outward view, a free external attack surface scan maps what your integration exposes to the internet: live subdomains, open ports, TLS and certificate state, and known CVEs on the services it reaches. Neither one is the annual penetration test.

What it does not do is satisfy the penetration test control. Guard assesses configuration; it does not manually test authentication, authorisation between seller accounts, or business logic in your application. Amazon’s own guide lists Guard and Amazon Inspector under tooling and describes penetration testing separately as a five stage exercise with a human tester attempting exploitation. The distinction is the same one we cover in manual pentest vs automated scanning.

The Security Compliance Self-Check Assessment

There is a second free thing, and it is easy to mistake for evidence. Amazon links a Security Compliance Self-Check Assessment from its policies and agreements page, described as a way to “evaluate your security practices against Amazon’s data protection requirements for Selling Partner API (SP-API) access”. It is a questionnaire rather than a scan. Run it, for the same reason you run Guard.

🔴 What separates it from Guard is that Amazon states its limits in writing. Three sentences, all Amazon’s own:

“This assessment is for general understanding only and does not replace Amazon’s formal security assessment requirements.”

“Completing this assessment is not a prerequisite for a formal assessment and does not determine whether Amazon selects your integration.”

“Your results have no bearing on any formal assessment outcome.”

So a clean self-check result is not evidence you can hold under section 3. And note the phrase “whether Amazon selects your integration”: Amazon runs a formal assessment of Solution Providers with its own published findings and deadlines, and the self-check is explicitly not a way in or out of it. If that has already started for you, the clocks are in what to do when Amazon publishes assessment findings against you. What does count as evidence is a different list: our SP-API DPP evidence checklist sets out the eight areas Amazon asks you to produce, their clauses, and which single one a penetration test produces.

So three free things now get mistaken for the annual test: Guard, which assesses AWS configuration; vulnerability scanning, which is a separate clause under 2.7.1 rather than a substitute for 2.7.2; and this self-check, which is a questionnaire. Each is worth doing. None of them is a penetration test, and the policy requires the test.

What the rest of the policy covers, and why this page does not

Clause 2.7.2 is the clause that names a penetration test, which is why a pentest vendor has anything to say about it. It is not the policy. The Data Protection Policy runs to four sections and 16 numbered clauses, with 22 sub-clauses beneath them, and 2.7.2 is one line inside one of those.

Two things follow. Section 1 binds every Solution Provider handling Amazon information, while Section 2 adds obligations that attach specifically to personally identifiable information. So the part of the policy that binds you is almost always wider than the part a penetration test can evidence, and a vendor who only ever discusses 2.7.2 has shown you a keyhole view of your own obligation.

Here is the whole shape, with an honest answer on who does each piece. Quotes are from the policy text, verified 30 August 2026.

ClauseWhat it requiresWho does this
1.1 Network and application securityFirewalls, network ACLs, endpoint protection, architecture documentationPentest for the external surface. Your team implements. Endpoint and device controls are neither
1.2 Access managementA documented request, approval, review and revoke process. Lockout “after no more than ten (10) consecutive unsuccessful login attempts”. Access removed “within twenty-four (24) hours of termination or role change”Pentest for lockout and access controls as built. Audit prep for the process and the records
1.3 Least privilegeAccess “limited to minimum necessary”Pentest. This is authorisation testing, cross-tenant isolation and IDOR work
1.4 Credential managementMFA on all user accounts, passwords at a “minimum of twelve (12) characters”, and programmatic credentials “encrypted at rest, rotated at least once every twelve (12) months”Pentest for MFA, credential handling and token rotation as implemented. Records prove the rotation actually happened
1.5 Encryption in transit”TLS 1.2 or higher, SFTP, and SSH-2”Pentest. One of the most direct clauses in the policy to evidence
1.6 Risk management and incident responseRisk process reviewed by senior management annually, an incident response plan, notification to Amazon “within twenty four (24) hours”, evidence handling, a named incident contactAudit prep. None of it is a testing problem
1.7 Data deletionSecure deletion “within 30 days” of Amazon’s noticeAudit prep, plus your engineering team
1.8 Data attributionA separate database, or a mechanism tagging the origin of dataAudit prep, checked in configuration
2.1 Data retentionPII retained “no longer than 30 days after order delivery”Audit prep
2.2 Data governanceA documented privacy and data handling policyAudit prep
2.3 Asset management”baseline standard configurations”, patching, and a change management processAudit prep, with configuration observed during a test
2.4 Encryption at rest”at least AES-128 or RSA with 2048-bit key size or higher”Partly a pentest observation, mostly configuration review
2.5 Secure coding”must not hardcode sensitive credentials in code”, test and production separatedPartly pentest, mostly your engineering practice
2.6 Logging and monitoringLogs gathered for security events, held for a minimum period, and monitored so suspicious activity raises an alarmPentest can show whether PII is reaching your logs. Retention and alerting are records and configuration
2.7 Vulnerability managementScanning every 30 days, penetration testing “at least every 365 days”, 7 day and 30 day remediation clocks, disaster recovery2.7.2 is the engagement. The rest is recurring process
2.8 SubcontractorsThird-party risk assessment “on an annual basis” before granting accessAudit prep

And the DPP is not the only policy you are held to

The Data Protection Policy is the one a penetration test touches. It is not the one that ends your API access. That is the Acceptable Use Policy, and it is the larger document: 44 numbered clauses across five sections, against the DPP’s 16. Its own opening says Solution Providers must comply with it “In addition to the Amazon Solution Provider Portal Agreement and the Data Protection Policy”, and its clause 3.13 pulls the DPP inside it, requiring you to “Comply with the Data Protection Policy”. So the DPP sits within the AUP, not beside it.

The difference matters when you are deciding what to buy. The DPP governs how you protect Amazon data, which is a controls problem your engineering lead owns. The AUP governs what your product is permitted to do with it, which is a decision your founder or product lead already made, probably months ago, and which leaves no trace in your infrastructure for anyone to test.

🔴 So a penetration test cannot find an Acceptable Use Policy violation, and no vendor’s can. We read all 44 clauses against what a test actually produces. Of the 26 that place a substantive obligation on a provider’s product or process, a test contributes input on seven, mostly where the clause describes an authorisation boundary you can probe, and it evidences none of them outright. The other nineteen are decisions and documents.

Three clauses decide product questions, and each one has taken a feature off somebody’s roadmap:

  • 4.4 “Do not aggregate data across Authorized Users’ businesses or customers obtained through the Amazon Services API to provide or sell to any parties, including competing Authorized Users.” A cross-seller benchmarking dashboard carries its value in exactly that comparison.
  • 4.2 “Do not target Amazon Customers for product marketing or review fabrication and modification using data retrieved through the Amazon Services API.” That is a remarketing feature.
  • 4.5 “Do not promote, publish or share insights about Amazon’s business.” That is a market-intelligence product.

Each of those can be built flawlessly. Every finding a tester raised against it would be closed, and the feature would still breach the clause. The useful control is a clause read at roadmap time, not an assessment at submission time.

One more reason not to leave the AUP until last: it is inside the audit scope and it produces nothing on its own. The records obligation in the DPP’s Section 3 requires books and records sufficient to verify compliance with “the Acceptable Use Policy, this DPP, and Solution Provider Portal Agreement”, and it names the Acceptable Use Policy first. Unless somebody has written that evidence down, there is none to produce. | 3 Audit and assessment | Records kept for 12 months, written certification on request, cooperation with an Amazon audit | Audit prep. This section is why the records matter at all |

Count the right-hand column and the split is stark. A penetration test speaks directly to roughly five clauses and partially to a handful more. Most of the policy is governance: process you can describe, records you can produce, and decisions someone has to have made and written down.

The question behind the table: what do you actually have to hand over?

The table above answers who does each piece. The question a submission actually puts to you is narrower and more practical: what evidence do you have to produce, and have you got it? Amazon runs that side of it as the Solution Provider Security Assessment, which sits alongside the policy rather than inside it, and it is where most of the work that is not a penetration test ends up.

Grouped by what you are asked to produce rather than by clause number, it falls into eight areas:

  1. Network and infrastructure security (clauses 1.1.1, 1.1.3): architecture diagram, internet-facing endpoint list, edge and WAF protections, detection, configuration monitoring.
  2. Endpoint and device security (1.1.2): malware protection, disk encryption, device restrictions, personal device policy.
  3. Access control and authentication (1.2.1 to 1.2.4, 1.4.1, 1.4.2): unique accounts, access reviews, MFA, password policy, API key handling.
  4. Data protection, encryption and privacy (1.4.2, 1.2.3): data attribution, encryption in transit and at rest, DLP, retention and deletion.
  5. Development and vulnerability management (2.7.1, 2.7.2, 2.7.3): secure SDLC, scan reports, the remediation clocks, and the annual penetration test.
  6. Monitoring, logging and incident response (2.6.1, 2.6.2, 1.6.2 to 1.6.5): centralised logging, alert review, exposure monitoring, incident response plan, and the named Incident Management Point of Contact.
  7. Operational and governance controls (2.7.4, 2.3.1, 2.3.2, 1.6.1): backups and restore tests, asset and change management, training, the policy set.
  8. SP-API specific obligations (section 3): data usage limits, transparency, prohibited activities, affiliates, notifications.

đź”´ Only one of those eight is produced by a penetration test, and it is area 5. Areas 1, 3 and 4 are partly evidenced by testing: TLS configuration, edge and WAF behaviour, account lockout, MFA enforcement, and secrets exposed in client-side code are all things a test can demonstrate are working. The policies and records behind them stay yours to hold. Areas 2, 6, 7 and 8 are not testing problems at all.

That ratio is the single most useful thing to know before you budget for a submission. A buyer who reads “annual penetration test required” and books one has covered one area of eight, and the gap does not appear until a reviewer asks for the other seven.

The eight areas are set out in full, with the clauses each maps to, on our SP-API DPP evidence checklist page. The checklist document itself, item by item, is sent on request. It sets out every item inside the eight areas, what satisfies each one, who produces it, and how Amazon weights it. A founder reads the request and sends it; we do not publish it, because the item-level judgement is the part that took the engagements to learn.

That governance half is real work and somebody has to do it. It is what our security audit and compliance readiness line exists for, and it covers most of the right-hand column above: access lifecycle and identity review, encryption and key management, incident response plan evaluation, logging and monitoring, data classification and handling, vendor and third-party risk, change management, and the evidence collection that Section 3 turns into an obligation. If you are buying the pentest from us and staffing the rest yourself, that is a perfectly good answer. We would rather you made that choice knowing the shape of what is left.

Why this list will need re-checking. Amazon revises this policy without announcing it, and quietly. Our own corrections log below records five claims on this page that decayed when clause 2.7 was restructured, effective 25 November 2025, nine months before we first reviewed it. Treat any clause table, ours included, as accurate on its stated date and not after. We re-verify this one quarterly.

Where we fit, and where we don’t

Section 2.7 has four technical legs. We serve one of them well, and we would rather say so than let you find out after signing.

The pentest leg: yes. Cybersecify does founder-led manual penetration testing of web applications, APIs and cloud environments, with both founders on every engagement. Clause 2.7.2’s four categories normally mean a four scope engagement: the web application, the API backend, the cloud environment and the network. Each is tested as its own scope, because the effort, the test cases and the threat surface are genuinely different in each one. A web application and the API behind it fail in different ways and are not one job with two names. Where the estate allows, the work can come to three scopes instead of four, and that is a scoping judgement made on what is actually in front of us, settled before anything is quoted.

Scopes and documents are not the same count, and that is deliberate. The web application and its API backend are tested separately but reported together, because someone reading about one system should not have to hold two documents open to follow it. So a four scope engagement can reach you as three reports. The number of documents describes how the findings read; it is never how the work was counted or priced.

Our Compliance Plan is INR 1,79,999 for two scopes, with each additional scope at INR 74,999. So a three scope DPP engagement is INR 2,54,998 and a four scope engagement is INR 3,29,997. A scope is six business days, five testing and one writing the report, and we confirm the full schedule when we scope the estate.

Every plan includes one full retest. One month from the v1.0 report is the outer bound, not a waiting period: we retest sooner when your fixes are in. It closes with a v2.0 report that supersedes v1.0, with updated status per finding and fresh proof for each fix. That retest is the second test Amazon’s guidance asks for.

Internal systems testing is also within what we do, and it is named in the policy itself rather than in the advisory guidance: clause 2.7.2’s first scope category is “network infrastructure, including public-facing and internal network boundaries, firewalls, routers, and switches”. Whether it belongs in your engagement depends on how much of your estate you manage yourself, so it is settled during scoping. Start at contact with your architecture rather than at a plan.

The 30 day vulnerability scanning leg: our free monthly scan covers the external half. We run a free monthly external attack surface scan and email you the report, so the internet-facing part of that requirement costs you nothing: see a sample or turn it on. It does not reach inside your network or behind authentication, and clause 2.7.1 applies to every system that stores, processes or transmits Amazon data, so pair it with your cloud provider’s native tooling. Look at your cloud provider’s native tooling first, since Amazon’s own guide points at Amazon Inspector for workload and network exposure scanning and at SP-API Guard for DPP-aligned configuration assessment. If your estate is broader than AWS, the market for recurring external scanning is well served and inexpensive. What you should insist on is that whatever you buy produces dated, retained output, because section 3 is a records requirement.

The change-triggered scanning leg: the one people miss, and we will tell you what satisfies it. Clause 2.7.1 requires a scan after significant network, application or infrastructure changes, with no interval attached. A monthly or quarterly scanning contract does not satisfy it, because the trigger is an event rather than a date. Whoever owns your change management should own this, and the output needs the same dated retention as everything else in 2.7, since section 3 is a records obligation.

The per-release code scanning leg: a pipeline job, and we will tell you what it has to produce. We do not sell SAST, DAST or IAST tooling or CI pipeline integration. Amazon’s guide names all three classes and expects the scan to run before every release, which makes this a build-pipeline problem rather than an engagement. Your existing CI platform very likely has a scanning step already. Turn it on, gate the release on it, and keep the output.

What no vendor can issue, including us. There is no Amazon-issued certificate for DPP compliance, no approved assessor list to be on, and no pass or fail letter for the pentest control. Any vendor implying otherwise is describing a programme that does not exist. What exists is a records obligation and an audit right, and your job is to be able to answer it.

If you want to sanity check what a manual engagement should cost and include before talking to anyone, pentest cost in India lays out the bands and the seven questions worth asking any vendor.

If you would rather see our own numbers against this clause specifically, our Amazon SP-API DPP penetration testing page maps the four 2.7.2 scope categories to what we test, with the price and the business days for a three and a four scope engagement.

How we keep this page current

We review published pages against their sources and update them when something has changed, so what you are reading stays accurate and usable. Each entry below records what changed and when. Some are changes in the source document itself, others are our own corrections. Dates are our review dates, not the source's change date.

  • 2026-11-02: Rewrote how this page describes the sample reports. It presented them as one client’s engagement and one client’s submission to Amazon, used as our proof that we do this work. A client’s submission is their business and not ours to put on a public page, and as evidence it told you nothing you could act on. The reports are unchanged, still sanitised with the client fictional, still sent on request and still read by a founder first. What the page now says about them is what matters to you: they are in the form a clause 2.7.2 submission takes, one per scope category Amazon enumerates, with findings mapped to the numbered policy sections.

  • 2026-10-17: đź”´ We said Amazon’s changelog does not carry the August 2026 revision. It does, and we were wrong about our own source. Yesterday’s entry below, and the renewal section it corrected, both stated that the SP-API changelog “still lists 25 November 2025 as its most recent entry” and that the August 2026 revision “appears only on Amazon’s separate announcement page”. We re-checked the changelog index directly: it carries an entry titled “SP-API Updates: Solution Provider Portal Agreement and Policy Updates”, which is this revision. So the claim that two Amazon surfaces disagreed was false, and the argument built on it has been removed. What actually happened is narrower and more useful: the November 2025 entry named the Data Protection Policy in its title and this one names the Portal Agreement, so a title-based watch missed it. The section now says that, and adds a text test for telling the two revisions apart, because the policy page still publishes no version or date. Nothing about clause 2.7.2 or the scope categories was affected. This is the second correction in two days on the same paragraph, and the cause both times was treating an announcement surface as the authority instead of diffing the policy text.

  • 2026-10-17: Corrected a false completeness claim. A FAQ answer said “Clause 2.7.2 reads in full” and then quoted the first of its six lines. The full clause, its four scope categories and its closing sentence are now set out in that answer, and the stray “The” we had added before “Solution Provider” is removed to match the policy text exactly. The conclusion the answer draws, that the clause is silent on who performs the test, is unchanged and is now supported by the whole clause rather than a sixth of it.

  • 2026-10-15: đź”´ Added the policy revision effective 25 August 2026. This page was a full revision behind, and said so in print. The renewal section stated what changed “per Amazon’s own changelog for the revision effective 25 November 2025” and presented that as current. It was not: Amazon published a further update effective 25 August 2026 that, among other things, expands the penetration testing and vulnerability scanning requirements to name Application Programming Interfaces explicitly. Nothing we quoted was wrong. Our clause 2.7.2 text and the four scope categories were re-checked against the live policy the same day and are correct. What was incomplete was our account of what had changed and when, which is a sourcing failure on the page a renewal buyer reads to answer exactly that question. Why we missed it, stated because it will catch others: we were tracking revisions through Amazon’s SP-API changelog, whose most recent entry is still 25 November 2025. The August 2026 revision appears only on Amazon’s separate announcement page. Two Amazon surfaces disagree, and we were watching the one that does not carry it. đź”´ [Superseded by the 2026-10-17 correction above: that explanation was wrong. Amazon’s changelog does carry the August 2026 revision. We left this text in place rather than editing it away, because it is what readers were told.]

  • 2026-09-18: Added our free monthly external attack surface scan to the clause 2.7.1 discussion. This page said the 30 day vulnerability scanning leg was not something we provide, while we run a free monthly scan and email the report. That was wrong by omission and it cost the reader money: they were sent to buy something we give away. The entry now states what the scan covers, and states plainly what it does not, since it reads the internet-facing surface only and 2.7.1 applies to every system that stores, processes or transmits Amazon data. We mark corrections inline rather than editing them away, because a reader who acted on an earlier version deserves to see what changed. Dates below are our review dates, not Amazon’s change dates. We read the full live policy on 9 August, 22 August and 29 August 2026, and Amazon’s restructuring of clause 2.7 took effect on 25 November 2025, so it predates all three. Our 9 August review did not catch it, which is why earlier versions of this page described the pre-restructure text.

  • 2026-09-17: Corrected the retest promise, which was slower than what we actually offer. This page said the free retest happens “within one month of the v1.0 report” and stopped there. One month is the outer bound, not a waiting period: we retest sooner when your fixes are in. /pricing/ has always stated both halves; this page published only the half that costs the reader time.

  • 2026-09-17: Reframed the “where we fit” section. Three consecutive headings read “not from us”, followed by “What nobody can sell you”. Every statement was true and the section still answered the wrong question for someone deciding whether to hire us. The same content now leads with what we deliver against each leg of clause 2.7: the test and the evidence package from us, and specifically what satisfies the scanning and code-scanning legs so a submission goes in complete. Nothing was softened: Amazon still decides, and no vendor issues a DPP certificate.

  • 2026-09-17: đź”´ Corrected the scope count and the price for a DPP engagement, in both places this page quoted them. The page said a DPP submission is “the Compliance Plan, INR 1,79,999 for two scopes over 12 business days”, and separately that “a two scope engagement covering the integrating application and its API backend maps cleanly onto a typical SP-API integration”. That was a two scope anchor on a four scope job. Clause 2.7.2 names four categories, and covering them normally takes four scopes: web application, API backend, cloud environment and network. Where effort allows we cover it in three, usually by testing the application and its API surface together. At the Compliance Plan’s published rates that is INR 2,54,998 at three scopes or INR 3,29,997 at four, not INR 1,79,999, and 6 business days per scope rather than a 10 day total. Publishing the base price for a job that is not the base scope is the exact failure this page criticises other vendors for, and it was ours.

  • 2026-09-17: Corrected how the scope compression works. A first pass at the correction above said we cover four categories in three scopes “by testing the application and its API surface as a single scope”. That is not what happens. The web application and the API backend are tested as separate scopes, because the effort, the test cases and the threat surface differ between them. What is combined is the report, not the testing, because a reader following one system should not need two documents open. So a four scope engagement can arrive as three reports, and the document count is not the scope count. The error mattered in the direction that makes the work look cheaper than it is, which is the same failure as the price correction above.

  • 2026-09-17: Added the Letter of Engagement alongside the Letter of Attestation. A DPP submission takes both documents from us and this page named only one of them. Both are issued on the Compliance Plan.

  • 2026-09-17: đź”´ Replaced the quoted text of section 2.7. The version printed here was the pre-restructure wording, and it had been wrong since 25 November 2025. This page said “here is section 2.7 in full” and then quoted a single flat paragraph, while its own key findings correctly described 2.7 as four numbered subsections. Both statements were on the page at once. Three specific errors in that quote: the preamble omitted “documented vulnerability management” before “plan and/or runbook”; a sentence about protecting “physical hardware containing PII” no longer appears in the policy at all; and the remediation clause was quoted as “critical risk impact vulnerabilities”, where the policy now reads “Critical vulnerabilities: 7 days from discovery”. The cause was ours, not Amazon’s. Our 22 August 2026 update applied the restructure to the summary and the key findings and never went back to the quote, so the most authoritative-looking element on the page was the only one still carrying the old text. Section 2.7 is now set out subsection by subsection, checked against the live policy on 17 September 2026.

  • 2026-09-17: Corrected the leg count from three to four, in five places. Clause 2.7.1 sets three minimum requirements, not two: 30 day scanning, change-triggered scanning following significant network, application or infrastructure changes, and per-release code scanning. The change-triggered requirement was absent from this page entirely. It matters commercially, because it has no interval attached, so a scanning contract on a fixed cadence does not satisfy it. Added to the “where we don’t fit” section as a leg we do not sell.

  • 2026-09-17: Clarified that the 2.7.3 remediation clocks attach to findings from vulnerability scanning and code scanning as well as from penetration testing. The page previously implied they were pentest clocks.

  • 2026-08-30: Corrected an attribution. This page said internal systems testing is something “Amazon’s guidance names alongside external-facing infrastructure”. It is named in the Data Protection Policy itself, clause 2.7.2, not in the advisory security-controls guidance, and Amazon’s wording in that clause is “public-facing and internal network boundaries”. The policy binds; the guidance advises, so the earlier wording understated the requirement.

  • 2026-08-30: Rewrote the pricing answer. It presented the Essentials Plan as suiting “a single-surface integrator” and cited SOC 2 and ISO 27001 control mapping as what makes the Compliance Plan fit. Both were misleading for this buyer. Clause 2.7.2 enumerates four scope categories that one scope cannot reach, and the Letter of Engagement, which is the document Amazon receives, is issued on the Compliance Plan only. The DPP contains no SOC 2 or ISO 27001 requirement at all, so control mapping is useful to your auditors rather than to Amazon.

  • 2026-08-30: Corrected the date attribution on the clause 2.7 restructure. This page said “Amazon restructured 2.7 between those two dates”, meaning between our 9 and 22 August 2026 reviews. That is wrong: Amazon’s restructure took effect 25 November 2025, nine months before our first review, and our 9 August review simply missed it. The “UPDATED” dates on this page are OUR review dates, not Amazon’s change dates, and are now labelled as such.

  • 2026-08-29: Corrected three word-frequency claims that decayed when Amazon restructured clause 2.7. We said the word “penetration” appears exactly once in the policy; it now appears five times, all inside 2.7. We printed the sub-clause headings as “2.7.1 Scanning”, “2.7.3 Remediation” and “2.7.4 Disaster Recovery”; Amazon prints “Vulnerability Scanning”, “Vulnerability Remediation” and “Disaster Recovery and Business Continuity”. The policy URL we cited now redirects, and is updated to the current canonical path. Verified against the live policy on 29 August 2026.

  • 2026-08-22: Updated for Amazon’s restructuring of Data Protection Policy clause 2.7 into sub-clauses 2.7.1 to 2.7.4, effective 25 November 2025. Clause 2.7.2 now names an “industry-recognized methodology”, which it did not previously. Statements on this page about what Amazon does and does not publish were revised accordingly.

  • 2026-08-09: Added a direct link to our internal network pentest service page, which Amazon’s guidance names alongside external-facing infrastructure. The page previously routed readers to the contact form without naming the service.

Frequently Asked Questions

Does Amazon SP-API require a penetration test?

Yes, but only under a specific condition. Section 2.7 of Amazon's Data Protection Policy requires Solution Providers to conduct penetration tests at least every 365 days. The condition is where that clause sits: section 2 is headed Additional Security Requirements Specific to Personally Identifiable Information, and it opens by saying those requirements apply to PII, which Amazon grants on a must-have basis for select tax and merchant fulfilled shipping purposes. Section 1, the General Security Requirements that every Solution Provider must meet, contains no penetration testing clause at all. The word penetration appears five times in the policy, all inside clause 2.7. It appeared exactly once before Amazon restructured 2.7 in November 2025. So the honest answer is that the pentest obligation binds developers holding restricted roles that expose PII, not every SP-API integrator. Two further points are worth carrying into any scoping conversation. The pentest is one of four technical obligations in 2.7, alongside vulnerability scanning at least every 30 days, change-triggered scanning after significant network, application or infrastructure changes, and code scanning before each release, so buying a test does not close the clause. And Amazon does not require you to submit the report; section 3 requires you to keep records and to certify compliance in writing when asked. Source: sellercentral.amazon.com/solution-provider/policy?policyType=DPP.

Which SP-API developers actually have to do a penetration test?

Developers whose applications hold restricted roles, which are the roles that provide access to personally identifiable information. Amazon's roles documentation marks five roles as restricted: Direct-to-Consumer Shipping, Professional Services, Selling Partner Support, Tax Invoicing and Tax Remittance. Amazon states that for restricted roles you must provide additional information about your data use and security controls. If your application only uses non-restricted roles such as Pricing, Product Listing, Inventory and Order Tracking, Finance and Accounting or Brand Analytics, section 2 of the Data Protection Policy is not the section that binds you, and section 1 has no pentest clause. A pentest may still be worth doing, and enterprise sellers or investors may ask for one anyway. Check which roles you hold before buying on the assumption that Amazon requires it. Amazon's own description of the Inventory and Order Tracking role is explicit that operations requiring it do not use the PII needed to ship an order, which is a useful test of whether a role is really pulling you into section 2. Applying for restricted roles also changes your registration path: you go through a two phase review including a data security assessment rather than the standard review. Source: developer-docs.amazon.com/sp-api/docs/roles-in-the-selling-partner-api.

Does Amazon require an independent third party to perform the SP-API penetration test?

The policy does not answer the question, and that is the point worth carrying. Clause 2.7.2 opens: Solution Provider must perform penetration testing at least every 365 days using an industry-recognized methodology. It then names four scope categories, network infrastructure, cloud environments, application-layer assets and other in-scope systems, and closes by requiring that the testing assess vulnerabilities across external-facing components, application functionality, access controls, system configurations and interfaces. Across all six lines it says nothing about who performs the test, not independent, not third-party, not external, not internal, and no tester qualification, verified against the policy text on 30 September 2026. The only Amazon sentence that mentions the tester sits in the separate security controls guidance, which says to perform annual penetration testing using qualified security professionals or third-party firms. The word or does permit qualified in-house testing, but it is guidance rather than policy, and neither the Data Protection Policy, the vulnerability management guide nor the security controls guidance names an accreditation body, an approved vendor panel or a required certification. The only independence language in the policy is in section 3, and it concerns Amazon's own right to audit you through an independent certified public accounting firm that Amazon selects. Read those together and the practical answer is not reassuring: the binding text is silent while the permissive wording sits in guidance, and a silent requirement leaves the question to whoever reviews your submission. A reviewer who asks for independent testing contradicts nothing Amazon has published. The cost of guessing wrong is also not symmetric. Budgeting for an independent test and not being asked costs you the difference between two ways of buying the same work. Testing in-house and then being asked costs you a second test, with the integration blocked while the clause 2.7.3 remediation clocks keep running. Three things you give up in-house are worth pricing either way. The Letter of Engagement, the document you hand Amazon, is issued by the firm running the test, and an internal team cannot issue itself one. Organisational independence is the condition the PCI Security Standards Council attaches to the same permission in its Penetration Testing Guidance information supplement, and a team testing the product it built usually does not meet it. And if Amazon comes back, a firm re-tests and re-issues under the original engagement while an internal team absorbs the delay. Sources: sellercentral.amazon.com Data Protection Policy clause 2.7.2 and section 3, developer-docs.amazon.com/sp-api/docs/guidance-to-address-key-security-controls-in-sp-api-integration.

What has to be in scope for an SP-API Data Protection Policy penetration test?

The policy's own applicability statement sets the outer boundary: the DPP applies to all systems that store, process, or otherwise handle data vended and retrieved from the Amazon Services API. In practice that means the application that talks to SP-API, its backend and APIs, any datastore holding Amazon data, and the hosting environment. Amazon's security controls guidance adds a direction that many scoping documents miss: test both external-facing infrastructure and internal systems with professional tools and methodologies. Amazon restructured clause 2.7 into 2.7.1 Vulnerability Scanning, 2.7.2 Penetration Testing, 2.7.3 Vulnerability Remediation and 2.7.4 Disaster Recovery and Business Continuity, and it now DOES enumerate scope. 2.7.2 requires testing 'using an industry-recognized methodology' and lists four categories: network infrastructure including public-facing and internal network boundaries, firewalls, routers and switches; cloud environments including cloud platforms and associated services and configurations; application-layer assets including web applications, APIs, databases and storage systems; and other in-scope systems as applicable, for example desktop or mobile applications. Verify the live policy yourself before scoping, and note that Amazon still publishes no required report FORMAT. Amazon also tells you to review its AWS penetration testing guidance before testing AWS services. Vendor claims about Amazon expecting specific OAuth token lifecycle coverage or a particular grey-box framing do not appear in Amazon's documentation. Token handling is worth testing on its merits, but do not write it into a compliance document as an Amazon requirement. One more scoping note from section 2 itself: if PII is combined with non-PII, Amazon states that the entire data store must comply with the section 2 requirements, so a shared database pulls more into scope than teams usually expect. Source: the Data Protection Policy preamble and developer-docs.amazon.com/sp-api/docs/guidance-to-address-key-security-controls-in-sp-api-integration.

Do I have to submit my penetration test report to Amazon?

Not routinely. The Data Protection Policy has no clause requiring you to upload or send a penetration test report as a matter of course. What section 3 requires is that you maintain all appropriate books and records reasonably required to verify compliance during the agreement and for 12 months afterwards, and that upon Amazon's written request you certify in writing that you are in compliance. Amazon reserves the right, on reasonable request, to audit, assess and inspect the books, records, facilities, operations and security of all systems involved in retrieving, storing or processing Amazon data, either itself or through an independent certified public accounting firm it selects. If that audit finds deficiencies you must remediate at your own cost within an agreed timeframe and provide remediation evidence in the form Amazon requests, with written approval required before closure. So the report is evidence you hold, not evidence you file. Source: Data Protection Policy section 3.

How often does the SP-API penetration test have to be done?

Every 365 days. Section 2.7 of the Data Protection Policy states that Solution Providers must conduct penetration tests at least every 365 days, alongside vulnerability scanning at least every 30 days and code vulnerability scanning prior to each release. Amazon's vulnerability management guide repeats the cadence and adds an important operational point: after the remediation stage, Solution Providers must run a second penetration test to validate that all identified vulnerabilities have been completely remediated. So the annual cycle is really test, remediate, retest. The remediation clocks are tight. Clause 2.7.3 gives critical vulnerabilities 7 days from discovery and high-risk vulnerabilities 30 days, and those clocks apply to findings from vulnerability scanning and code scanning as well as from the pentest. Plan the engagement so that the retest and the 7 day critical window can both be met, which usually means not booking a test the week before a major release. Amazon describes the exercise in five stages: planning, scan and discovery, penetration, analysis and report, then remediation and clean up, with the validation test following. As restructured, 2.7.2 now requires an 'industry-recognized methodology'. Amazon still names no specific framework and still sets no required report format, so OWASP WSTG, PTES or a comparable published methodology satisfies the wording, and the shape of the report remains yours to define and defend. Source: developer-docs.amazon.com/sp-api/docs/vulnerability-management.

What else does DPP section 2.7 require besides the penetration test?

Four technical legs, not one. Clause 2.7.1 alone sets three: vulnerability scanning at least every 30 days, change-triggered scanning following significant network, application or infrastructure changes, and code scanning completed prior to each software release. Clause 2.7.2 adds the penetration test at least every 365 days. It also requires a documented vulnerability management plan or runbook, remediation of critical vulnerabilities within 7 days and high-risk vulnerabilities within 30 days of discovery under 2.7.3, procedures to restore availability and access to PII after a physical or technical incident, and a geographically separated secondary or backup site to support timely restoration against defined RTO and RPO targets under 2.7.4. A penetration test satisfies exactly one of those legs. Buying a pentest and treating section 2.7 as closed is the most common mistake we see described in developer discussions of this policy. Amazon's own guidance describes SAST, DAST and IAST as the code scanning tool classes, and points at Amazon Inspector for workload and network exposure scanning. Section 2.7 also requires backups held at a geographically separated secondary site so PII access can be restored against defined RTO and RPO targets, which is an infrastructure commitment rather than a testing one. Source: Data Protection Policy section 2.7.

What is SP-API Guard and does it satisfy the penetration test requirement?

SP-API Guard is Amazon's own free tool. Amazon describes it as a serverless application that scans Amazon Web Services accounts to assess security compliance with Amazon's Data Protection Policy, using custom scan rules built with AWS security services to look for security gaps and returning a findings report with remediation recommendations after 24 hours. It is genuinely useful and it costs nothing, so run it before you buy anything. What it does not do is satisfy the penetration test control. Guard assesses AWS account configuration against DPP requirements; it is an automated configuration assessment, not a manual test of your application's authentication, authorisation and business logic. Amazon's vulnerability management guide lists Guard and Amazon Inspector under tooling, and describes penetration testing separately as a five stage exercise with a human tester attempting to exploit vulnerabilities. Treat Guard as coverage for the configuration layer and the 30 day scanning habit, not as the annual test. Source: developer.amazonservices.com/guard.

What happens during the SP-API restricted role data security assessment?

Registering for restricted roles puts your developer profile through a two phase review rather than the standard review path. Phase 1 is business verification and developer profile assessment: Amazon reviews your website for compliance with its acceptable use policies, expects it to be publicly accessible with a clear description of your business, professional design and content standards, complete business contact information, HTTPS, and published privacy policy and terms of service. It also assesses your profile for a clear account of how you intend to use SP-API and handle seller data. Phase 2 is the data security assessment, a review of your application's data flow architecture, PII protection controls, data storage and handling procedures, security protocols, and incident response and data breach procedures. Amazon also says applicants for restricted roles should prepare for an architecture review with the SP-API Solutions Architecture team, which can involve a screen sharing demo. Source: developer-docs.amazon.com/sp-api/docs/register-as-a-public-developer.

How much does an SP-API penetration test cost?

Amazon does not set or publish a price, and most of this market does not publish prices at all, so the honest answer is that it depends on scope. What we can tell you is our own, because we publish it. For a DPP submission the plan is the Compliance Plan, but the honest number is not the base price, because clause 2.7.2 enumerates four categories the test must cover: network infrastructure including internal boundaries, cloud environments, application-layer assets including APIs and storage, and other in-scope systems such as desktop or mobile. đź”´ Those are categories, not a scope count, and the difference decides your price. The clause names four categories; how many scopes sit inside each depends on what you actually run and what touches Amazon data. Application-layer alone is enumerated in the plural, web applications, APIs, databases and storage systems, so a seller with two products and three APIs is past four scopes on that category by itself. Four is the common shape, one each for the web application, the API backend, the cloud environment and the network, and each is its own scope because the effort, the test cases and the threat surface differ. But it moves in both directions. Where the estate allows, the work comes to three or even two: a seller on managed hosting with no cloud account and no internal network has fewer categories in play, and we have scoped exactly that. A larger estate goes the other way. We confirm the count at scoping rather than printing a formula here, because a formula that fits your architecture is a coincidence, not a quote. Note that scopes and documents are different counts: the web application and its API backend are tested separately but reported together, so a four scope engagement can arrive as three reports. The Compliance Plan is INR 1,79,999 for two scopes and each additional scope is INR 74,999, so a realistic DPP engagement is INR 2,54,998 at three scopes or INR 3,29,997 at four, with 12 hours of founder-led consulting and one free retest. A scope is six business days, five testing and one writing the report, and we confirm the full schedule when we scope the estate. We would rather publish that number than quote you the two scope price and raise it once we have seen your architecture. Second, the paperwork: a DPP submission takes two documents from us, not one. The Letter of Engagement evidences that an independent firm was engaged to perform the test, which is the thing Amazon wants to see rather than your own team's word. The Letter of Attestation, signed by the lead tester, follows the retest and confirms what was tested and what state it ended in. Both are issued on the Compliance Plan. Our Essentials Plan at INR 74,999 covers one scope over 6 business days and is a real option for a genuinely single-surface product, but it does not carry those letters. Note what Amazon does NOT ask for: the DPP contains no SOC 2 or ISO 27001 requirement, so treat control mapping as useful for your auditors rather than as something Amazon wants. Both plans include one full retest, triggered when your fixes are in and no later than one month from the v1.0 report, which lines up with the second test Amazon's guidance expects after remediation. Full detail is on our pricing page.

Does Amazon's Security Compliance Self-Check Assessment satisfy the DPP penetration test requirement?

No, and Amazon states that directly rather than leaving it to inference. The Security Compliance Self-Check Assessment is a free voluntary questionnaire linked from Amazon's policies and agreements page, offered so a Solution Provider can evaluate its security practices against Amazon's data protection requirements for SP-API access. Amazon's own description sets three limits on it. This assessment is for general understanding only and does not replace Amazon's formal security assessment requirements. Completing this assessment is not a prerequisite for a formal assessment and does not determine whether Amazon selects your integration. Your results have no bearing on any formal assessment outcome. Read together, those sentences mean a clean self-check result is not a compliance artefact: it is not evidence you can hold under section 3 of the Data Protection Policy, it does not satisfy clause 2.7.2, and it changes nothing Amazon decides about your integration. It is still worth completing, because identifying your own gaps before an assessor does is cheaper than the alternative, and Amazon frames it exactly that way when it tells you to use it to identify gaps, plan remediation and strengthen compliance. Treat it as preparation rather than proof. Source: developer-docs.amazon/sp-api/docs/policies-and-agreements.

Do I need a retest after remediating findings for SP-API compliance?

Amazon's vulnerability management guide says yes. After the remediation stage, Solution Providers must run a second penetration test to validate that all identified vulnerabilities have been completely remediated. That sentence should shape how you buy, not just how you plan. A vendor who prices the retest as a separate engagement, or who cannot commit to a turnaround inside the 7 day critical and 30 day high remediation windows in section 2.7, turns a compliance requirement into a budget surprise. Ask about retest scope, retest timing and what the retest deliverable looks like before you sign. At Cybersecify both plans include one full retest within one month of the v1.0 report, and sooner if your fixes land before that, closing with a v2.0 report that supersedes v1.0 with updated status per finding and fresh proof for each fix, which is the format an auditor or an Amazon assessor can actually read. Keep both reports. Section 3 of the policy requires you to maintain records reasonably needed to verify compliance for the term of the agreement and 12 months afterwards, so the retest evidence is part of the file you may have to produce, not a formality that ends when the ticket closes. Source: developer-docs.amazon.com/sp-api/docs/vulnerability-management.

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